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SERIES PREFACE
any years ago, Jim Casey, a founder and long-time CEO of the United

M

Parcel Service, observed that his least prepared and least effective employees were those unfortunate individuals who, for various reasons, had spent

much of their youth in institutions or who had been passed through multiple foster care placements. When his success in business enabled him and his siblings to
establish a philanthropy (named in honor of their mother, Annie E. Casey), Mr.
Casey focused his charitable work on improving the circumstances of disadvantaged children, in particular by increasing their chances of being raised in stable,
nurturing family settings. His insight about what kids need to become healthy,
productive citizens helps to explain the Casey Foundation’s historical commitment
to juvenile justice reform. Over the past two decades, we have organized and
funded a series of projects aimed at safely minimizing populations in juvenile correctional facilities through fairer, better informed system policies and practices and
the use of effective community-based alternatives.
In December 1992, the Annie E. Casey Foundation launched a multi-year,
multi-site project known as the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI).
JDAI’s purpose was straightforward: to demonstrate that jurisdictions can establish more effective and efficient systems to accomplish the purposes of juvenile
detention. The initiative was inspired by work that we had previously funded in
Broward County, Florida, where an extremely crowded, dangerous, and costly
detention operation had been radically transformed. Broward County’s experience
demonstrated that interagency collaboration and data-driven policies and programs could reduce the numbers of kids behind bars without sacrificing public
safety or court appearance rates.
Our decision to invest millions of dollars and vast amounts of staff time in
JDAI was not solely the result of Broward County’s successful pilot endeavors,
however. It was also stimulated by data that revealed a rapidly emerging national
crisis in juvenile detention. From 1985 to 1995, the number of youth held in
secure detention nationwide increased by 72 percent (see Figure A). This increase
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might be understandable if the youth
in custody were primarily violent
offenders for whom no reasonable
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alternative could be found. But other
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data (see Figure B) reveal that less
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custody (in a one-day snapshot in
1995) were charged with violent
acts. In fact, far more kids in this
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Source: Census of Public and Private Juvenile Detention, Correctional
and Shelter Facilities, 1985-1995.

lations) and failures to comply with
conditions of supervision than for
FIGURE B

dangerous delinquent behavior.
Disturbingly, the increases in the

ONE-DAY COUNTS IN DETENTION FACILITIES
BY OFFENSE CATEGORY, 1995

numbers of juveniles held in secure
detention facilities were severely dis-

9,247
Violent offenses—28.6%
7,041

proportionate across races. In 1985,

8,355

approximately 56 percent of youth in

Status offenses and technical
violations—33.9%

detention on a given day were white,
while 44 percent were minority
youth. By 1995, those numbers were

Property, drugs, public order,
and “other”*—37.5%

*Examples of “other” include alcohol and technical violations.
Source: Census of Public and Private Juvenile Detention, Correctional
and Shelter Facilities, 1985-1995.

reversed (see Figure C), a consequence of greatly increased detention
rates for African American and

FIGURE C

JUVENILES IN PUBLIC DETENTION CENTERS
BY MINORITY STATUS, 1985-1995

Hispanic youth over this 10-year
period.1
As juvenile detention utilization

minority 43.4%
white 56.6%

minority 56.4%
white 43.6%

escalated nationally, crowded facilities became the norm rather than the
exception. The number of facilities

1985

1995

Source: Census of Public and Private Juvenile Detention, Correctional
and Shelter Facilities, 1985-1995.
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operating above their rated capacities rose by 642 percent, from 24 to 178,
between 1985 and 1995 (see Figure D), and the percentage of youth held in overcrowded detention centers rose from 20 perFIGURE D

cent to 62 percent during the same decade (see

NUMBER OF OVERCROWDED U.S. PUBLIC
DETENTION CENTERS, 1985-1995

Figure E). In 1994, almost 320,000 juveniles
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entered overcrowded facilities compared to

175

61,000 a decade earlier.
Crowding is not a housekeeping problem

150

that simply requires facility administrators to

125

put extra mattresses in day rooms when it’s
100

time for lights out. Years of research and court

75

cases have concluded that overcrowding pro-

50

duces unsafe, unhealthy conditions for both
detainees and staff. A recently published report
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by staff of the National Juvenile Detention
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rizes crowding’s impact:

Source: Census of Public and Private Juvenile Detention,
Correctional and Shelter Facilities, 1985–1995.

FIGURE E
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Source: Census of Public and Private Juvenile Detention,
Correctional and Shelter Facilities, 1985–1995.

Association and the Youth Law Center summa-

1995

Crowding affects every aspect of institutional life, from the provision of basic services such as food and bathroom access to
programming, recreation, and education.
It stretches existing medical and mental
health resources and, at the same time, produces more mental health and medical
crises. Crowding places additional stress on
the physical plant (heating, plumbing, air
circulation) and makes it more difficult to
maintain cleaning, laundry, and meal
preparation. When staffing ratios fail to
keep pace with population, the incidence of
violence and suicidal behavior rises. In
crowded facilities, staff invariably resort to
increased control measures such as lockdowns and mechanical restraints.2
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Crowding also puts additional financial pressure on an already expensive public service. Operating costs for public detention centers more than doubled
between 1985 and 1995, from $362 million to almost $820 million (see Figure F).
Some of these increased operating expenses are no
FIGURE F

doubt due to emergencies, overtime, and other

TOTAL OPERATING EXPENDITURES IN
U.S. PUBLIC DETENTION CENTERS, 1985-1995

unbudgeted costs that result from crowding.
JDAI was developed as an alternative to these

$1,000,000

trends, as a demonstration that jurisdictions

$900,000

could control their detention destinies. The ini-

$800,000

tiative had four objectives:

$700,000

■

to eliminate the inappropriate or unnecessary use
of secure detention;

■

■

$500,000

to minimize failures to appear and the incidence
of delinquent behavior;

■

$600,000

$400,000

to redirect public finances from building new

$300,000

facility capacity to responsible alternative strate-

$200,000

gies; and

$100,000

to improve conditions in secure detention facilities.
1985

To accomplish these objectives, participating
sites pursued a set of strategies to change deten-

1987
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1991

1993

Source:
Source: Census
Census of
of Public
Public and
and Private
Private Juvenile
Juvenile Detention,
Detention,
Correctional
Correctional and
and Shelter
Shelter Facilities,
Facilities, 1985–1995.
1985-1995.
Operating expenditures are not adjusted for inflation.

tion policies and practices. The first strategy was
collaboration, the coming together of disparate juvenile justice system stakeholders
and other potential partners (like schools, community groups, the mental health
system) to confer, share information, develop systemwide policies, and promote accountability. Collaboration was also essential for sites to build a consensus
about the limited purposes of secure detention. Consistent with professional standards and most statutes, they agreed that secure detention should be used only to
ensure that alleged delinquents appear in court at the proper times and to protect the
community by minimizing serious delinquent acts while their cases are being processed.

1995
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Armed with a clearer sense of purpose, the sites then examined their systems’
operations, using objective data to clarify problems and dilemmas and to suggest
solutions. They changed how admissions decisions were made (to ensure that only
high-risk youth were held), how cases were processed (particularly to reduce
lengths of stay in secure detention), and created new alternatives to detention
programs (so that the system had more options). Each site’s detention facility was
carefully inspected and deficiencies were corrected so that confined youth were
held in constitutionally required conditions. Efforts to reduce disproportionate
minority confinement and to handle “special” detention cases (e.g., probation
violations or warrants) were also undertaken.
In practice, these reforms proved far more difficult to implement than they are
now to write about. We began JDAI with five sites: Cook County, IL; Milwaukee
County, WI; Multnomah County, OR; New York City; and Sacramento County,
CA. Just about when implementation activities were to begin, a dramatic shift
occurred in the nation’s juvenile justice policy environment. High-profile cases,
such as the killing of several tourists in Florida, coupled with reports of significantly increased juvenile violence, spurred both media coverage and new legislation
antithetical to JDAI’s notion that some youth might be “inappropriately or unnecessarily” detained. This shift in public opinion complicated matters in virtually all
of the sites. Political will for the reform strategies diminished as candidates tried to
prove they were tougher on juvenile crime than their opponents. Administrators
became reluctant to introduce changes that might be perceived as “soft” on
delinquents. Legislation was enacted that drove detention use up in several places.
Still, most of the sites persevered.
At the end of 1998, three of the original sites—Cook, Multnomah, and
Sacramento Counties—remained JDAI participants. Each had implemented a
complex array of detention system strategies. Each could claim that they had
fundamentally transformed their system. Their experiences, in general, and the
particular strategies that they implemented to make their detention systems
smarter, fairer, more efficient, and more effective, offer a unique learning laboratory
for policymakers and practitioners who want to improve this critical component of

SERIES PREFACE

the juvenile justice system. To capture their innovations and the lessons they
learned, we have produced this series of publications—Pathways to Juvenile
Detention Reform. The series includes 13 monographs, all but two of which cover
a key component of detention reform. (As for the other two monographs, one is a
journalist’s account of the initiative, while the other describes Florida’s efforts to
replicate Broward County’s reforms statewide.) A complete list of the titles in the
Pathways series is provided at the end of this publication.
By the end of 1999, JDAI’s evaluators, the National Council on Crime and
Delinquency, will have completed their analysis of the project, including quantitative evidence that will clarify whether the sites reduced reliance on secure detention without increasing rearrest or failure-to-appear rates. Data already available,
some of which was used by the authors of these monographs, indicate that they
did, in spite of the harsh policy environment that drove detention utilization up
nationally.
For taking on these difficult challenges, and for sharing both their successes and
their failures, the participants in the JDAI sites deserve sincere thanks. At a time
when kids are often disproportionately blamed for many of society’s problems, these
individuals were willing to demonstrate that adults should and could make important changes in their own behavior to respond more effectively to juvenile crime.
Bart Lubow
Senior Associate and Initiative Manager
The Annie E. Casey Foundation
Notes
1 In 1985, white youth were detained at the rate of 45 per 100,000, while African American and Hispanic

rates were 114 and 73, respectively. By 1995, rates for whites had decreased by 13 percent, while the
rates for African Americans (180 percent increase) and Hispanics (140 percent increase) had skyrocketed. Wordes, Madeline and Sharon M. Jones. 1998. “Trends in Juvenile Detention and Steps
Toward Reform,” Crime and Delinquency, 44(4):544–560.
2 Burrell, Sue, et. al., Crowding in Juvenile Detention Centers: A Problem-Solving Manual, National Juvenile

Detention Association and Youth Law Center, Richmond, KY, prepared for the U.S. Department of
Justice, Department of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
(December 1998), at 5–6.
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Chapter 1

WHY SHOULD WE FOCUS ON RACIAL
DISPARITIES IN JUVENILE DETENTION?
t is impossible to talk about juvenile detention reform without talking about the

I

disproportionate confinement of youth of color. As noted in the preface, the
number of youth held in secure detention nationwide increased by 72% from

1985 to 1995. During this period, the proportion of white youth in detention
dropped, and youth of color came to represent a majority of the young people
detained. Between 1983 and 1997, the overall youth detention population
increased by 47%, but the detained white youth population increased by 21%,
while the detained minority youth population grew by 76%1. This means that 80%

of the increase in youth being detained during these years were youth of color, or
put another way, 4 out of 5 new youth detained during this 15-year period were
youth of color. Recent research by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention (OJJDP) and the Building Blocks for Youth initiative has documented
the scale at which youth of color are affected by policies that have expanded the use
of juvenile detention:
■

Of the 105,790 youth in juvenile detention facilities prior to adjudication or
committed to state juvenile correctional facilities following adjudication in 1997,
minority youth represented 63% committed, even though they only represent
34% of the total youth population in the United States. White youth represented
71% of the youth arrested for crimes nationwide but only 37% of committed
youth.2

■

In 1997–98, African American youth represented 15% of the total youth
population, but 26% of the youth arrested, 31% of the youth referred to juvenile
court, and 44% of the youth detained.3
By 1997, in 30 out of 50 states (which contain 83% of the U.S. population)

youth of color represented the majority of youth in detention. Even in states with
tiny ethnic and racial minority populations (like Minnesota, where the general
population is 90% white, and Pennsylvania, where the general population is 85%
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white), more than half of the detention population are youth of color. In 1997,
OJJDP found that in every state in the country (with the exception of Vermont),
the minority population of detained youth exceeded their proportion in the general
population.4
Because detention is a key entry point from which youth further penetrate the
juvenile justice system, decisions made at detention can have a profound impact on
disproportionality throughout the system. Both aggregate national and individual
state data show that racial disparities increase at every stage of the juvenile justice
process. For example, when white youth and African American youth with no prior
admissions to public facilities were charged with the same offenses, African
American youth were six times more likely to be incarcerated than white youth.
Latino youth were three times more likely than white youth to be incarcerated. In
1997, youth of color comprised 46% of the cases transferred by the judicial system
to adult criminal court and 58% of the youth admitted to state prisons. Three out
of four youth admitted to a state prison in 1997 were minority.5 If disparities in
detention could be reduced, these subFIGURE 1

sequent disparities should also decline.
Since the increase in juvenile detention utilization was fueled almost
wholly by the increased incarceration
of youth of color, any strategy designed
to reduce the number of young people
detained must address race, and the
“race effect,” that researchers say follow
racial and ethnic minorities as they
travel through the justice system.
Juvenile detention reform efforts must
reflect the reality that minority youth
bear the brunt of policies that lead to
the arrest, processing, detaining, adjudication, and imprisonment of young
people.

DEFINING THE PROBLEM: DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONFINEMENT

Minority
An individual who is of a race other than white or who is of Latino ethnicity, regardless of
race. These groups are considered minorities within the U.S. context.
Disproportionate Minority Confinement (DMC)
A condition that exists when a racial/ethnic group’s representation in confinement exceeds
their representation in the general population.
Disparity
Different treatment of individuals who are similarly situated or who have common
characteristics.
Discrimination
Occurs in the juvenile justice system when decisionmakers treat one group of juveniles
differently from another group of juveniles based wholly or in part on their gender, racial,
and/or ethnic identity.
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act Mandate
Since 1988, the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act has required states that
receive funding under the act to determine whether the proportion of juvenile minorities in
confinement exceeds their proportion in the general population. The act was amended by
Congress in 1992 to make it a “core requirement” that states demonstrate they are taking
efforts to reduce DMC.
Source
Youth Crime/Adult Time, Building Blocks for Youth (October 2000). “Minorities in the
Juvenile Justice System.” Juvenile Justice Bulletin. (December, 1999).
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In this Pathway we explore why youth of color are overrepresented in the
juvenile detention system and review what has been done in some sites to reduce
the number of minority youth in detention. Dealing with disparity in the use of
detention has been one of the most challenging pieces of the detention reform
puzzle in the different jurisdictions working on the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s
Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI). As the preface notes, since the
early 1990s, the Foundation has worked closely with a series of communities to
promote detention reform, including Cook County, IL; Multnomah County, OR;
Sacramento County, CA; and Santa Cruz County, CA. While JDAI was not
originally conceived as a DMC reduction program, the sites wrestled with the issue
for varying periods of time. Together, the stories of what occurred in the JDAI sites
provide important guidance on how to reduce racial and ethnic disparities in the
use of detention.
There are, of course, many factors beyond the scope of the juvenile justice
system that influence the disparate detention of youth of color (see Figure 1). Many
of these broader problems are beyond the scope of juvenile justice reform
advocates. However, we now know there are strategies that can be used to begin
reducing the number of youth of color in detention and to create a fairer and
more equitable system.
Notes
1Numbers

of youth detained from Sickmund, Melissa and Snyder, Howard. Juvenile Offenders and

Victims: 1997 Update on Violence—Statistical Summary. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, 1997; Sickmund, Melissa and Snyder, Howard. Juvenile Offenders and Victims:
1999 National Report. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2000.
2Jones,

Michael and Poe-Yamagata, Eileen. And Justice for Some. Washington, DC: Building Blocks for

Youth, 2000.
3Jones

and Poe-Yamagata, 2000.

4Snyder,

Howard et al. Easy Access to Juvenile Court Statistics: 1988–1997 [data presentation and analysis

package]. Pittsburgh, PA: National Center for Juvenile Justice [producer]. Washington, DC: Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention [distributor], 1999.
5Jones

and Poe-Yamagata, 2000.
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Chapter 2

GUIDING PRINCIPALS FOR REDUCING
DMC IN DETENTION

A

number of key principals emerged over the course of the work described in
Chapter 4. On reflection, they seem appropriate to any efforts aimed at

■

eliminating racial disparities in detention. They include:

All children should be treated equally within the juvenile detention system.
Although it should be unnecessary to state, if white youth and youth of color
commit the same offense, and have similar delinquency histories, they should
have the same likelihood of being detained. Unfortunately, this is often not the
case. Objectives of detention reform, therefore, should include unbiased, raceneutral assessments to guide admission decisions and equal access to various release
opportunities for all youth. Barriers to minority youths’ access to alternatives-todetention programs, for example, must be removed, even if those barriers are
unintended. For example, some youth may be unlikely to participate in certain
programs because of where the program is located. In some jurisdictions, this
phenomenon might not even be examined, much less seen as something that can
be fixed. But, if a barrier such as program location results in differential access
by race, change is needed. However, while most everyone agrees with this basic
principle, many systems lack sufficient focus and determination to identify and
eliminate factors that contribute to racially unequal treatment.

■

Racial disparities in detention occur because of both conscious and subconscious racism. Individualized and institutionalized racism play the same roles in
juvenile detention that they do in other aspects of American life, although it is
often harder to reconcile this reality with the articulated ideals of our justice
system. Whether the issue is racial profiling of motorists, police shootings of
unarmed citizens, unequal application of the death penalty, or lack of access to
quality defense representation, racism influences the decisions that are made and
the options that are available in the justice system just as they do in housing,
employment, or education. All forms of racism, both overt and subconscious,

14
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must be confronted and remedied if we want a genuinely fair justice system,
including one that does not detain certain groups more than others only because
of the color of their skin or their ethnicity.
■

Disparities in detention are often unintended consequences of seemingly raceneutral practices. In many places, decisionmakers simply did not know that new
laws or policies would result in the disparate detention of youth of color. For
example, in Illinois, legislators believed that requiring youth to be tried as adults
for drug sales within 1,000 feet of a school or public housing project would
reduce drug crime. They did not anticipate that in Cook County this law would
almost exclusively impact youth of color—where 99% of the youth legislatively
excluded from juvenile court for drug crimes were African American or Latino.
A consistent, self-conscious focus on the potential racial impact of policy and
program choices is needed to avoid these kinds of unintended consequences.

■

Data must be collected and carefully analyzed to inform efforts to reduce racial
disparity in the detention system. Data and data-analysis capabilities are key
tools to map out strategies to reduce DMC. By measuring how youth of different races and ethnicities are treated at every stage of the process, we can figure
out where there may be barriers to fair treatment. Data can also provide juvenile
justice officials with objective evidence of DMC, thereby making it easier to raise
the issue. Data identify how DMC looks and how it operates in a system, without resorting to anecdotes or emotionally charged debates over individual bias.

■

Leadership makes a difference. Historically, the most successful sites in virtually
all major juvenile justice reform effort were places where the top-level policymakers clearly and forcefully embraced change and challenged their colleagues
and staff to join them in the transformation process. These experiences affirm the
importance of “naming” the problem and of having the authority to enable
everyone to confront unpleasant or risky situations.

■

Both individuals and agencies have a responsibility to address this issue. Racial
disparities in detention happen because both individual decision-makers and
entire agencies make discretionary judgments and implement policies that treat
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minority youth differently from similarly situated white youth. Oftentimes,
individuals fail to take responsibility for these disparities because they believe that
larger systemic or organizational changes are the only ones that can make a
difference. Individual inertia, however, can only lead to agency passivity in the
face of such a chronic and sensitive issue. Failure to address either individual or
agency choices is likely to undermine efforts to make improvements at all levels
of the system.
■

While we cannot control all the factors that lead to racial disparities, there are
things we can control and change in the detention system. No single juvenile
detention reform strategy can alter the historical influences of racism in America
and, in particular, their impact on the treatment of people of color by the justice
system. Still, sites have shown that by focusing on things they can change within
the detention system they can make a large difference in the outcomes for many
youth of color and divert or expedite their exit from locked facilities in ways that
makes a meaningful contribution to their lives.
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Chapter 3

DEFINING THE PROBLEM: THE SCOPE AND
CAUSES OF DMC
I learned very early on that when we got an African American youth, virtually
everything from arrest summaries, to family history, to rap sheets, to psychiatric
exams was skewed. If a middle-class white youth was sent to us as “dangerous,” he
was more likely actually to be so than an African American teenager given the
same label. The white teenager was more likely to have been afforded competent
legal counsel and appropriate psychiatric and psychological testing, tried in a
variety of privately funded options, and dealt with more sensitively and individually at every stage of the juvenile justice processing. For him to be labeled
“dangerous” he had to have done something very serious indeed.—Jerome G. Miller,
Search and Destroy: African-American Males in the Criminal Justice System (1996)

The preceding quote from Jerome G. Miller, who has run juvenile justice
systems in Massachusetts, Illinois, and Pennsylvania, captures a reality that most
juvenile justice workers know all too well. Until the past decade or so, however, the
scale of overrepresentation had not been quantified on a state or national scale. But
starting in 1989, a federal government mandate through the Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act1 required states to “address” disproportionate
minority confinement to be eligible for certain federal juvenile justice funds.
Despite serious limitations on what we know about Latino youth (in many
systems, Latinos are defined as “white”), the JJDPA federal requirement has, at the
very least, produced data that researchers can analyze to paint a national picture.
In 1997–98, African American youth represented 15% of the total youth population, but 26% of the youth arrested, 31% of the youth referred to juvenile court,
44% of the youth detained, 46% of the youth judicially waived to criminal court,
and 58% of the youth admitted to state prison (see Figure 2).2
Both in the local and national contexts, research indicates that the racial
disparities found in populations at juvenile training schools and state prisons are the
end products of actions that occur at earlier points in the juvenile justice system—
the decision to make the initial arrest, the decision to hold a youth in detention
pending investigation, or the decision to petition a case. In a seminal meta-analysis
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conducted by researchers Carl Pope
and William Feyerherm, two-thirds
of the studies of state and local juvenile justice systems they analyzed
found that there was a “race effect”
at some stage of the juvenile justice
process, which resulted in poorer
outcomes for youth of color.3 Their
research suggested that “the effects
of race may be felt at various decision points, they may be direct or
indirect, and they may accumulate
as youth continue through the sys-

FIGURE 2

THE PROPORTION OF AFRICAN AMERICAN YOUTH INCREASES AT EVERY STAGE OF
INVOLVEMENT IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM

African American youth make up 15%
of the youth population as a whole

African American youth make up 26%
of youth who are arrested

African American youth make up 44%
of youth who are detained

African American youth make up 46% of
youth judicially waived to criminal court

African American youth make up 58%
of youth admitted to state prisons

tem.” The starkness of these data
necessitates asking how there can be

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%
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Source: Yamagata, Eileen Poe and Michael A. Jones. And Justice for Some: Differential Treatment of Minority
Youth in the Justice System. Washington, DC: Building Blocks for Youth, April 2000.

so much disparity in a justice system
that proposes to strive for fairness?
Structural inequalities: The Social Context of Being a Youth of Color
Like most matters of race in the United States, DMC does not begin at the arrest
stage but at the “starting gate”—the social contexts into which many youth of
color are born. The causes of disproportionate minority confinement in significant
part are attributable both to the social and economic conditions these youth face
in this country and to racism and its vestiges such as segregation in housing,
education, and employment (see Figures 3 and 4). On every indicator of social wellbeing, whites are better off than African Americans, Hispanics, Asians, or other
minorities. The chart below presents some key indicators of social and economic
well-being. These numbers speak to the social conditions of the lives of many
children of color. Given where many begin —more likely to die before their first
birthday, less well educated, more likely to die a violent death, and more likely to
come from families that are economically marginalized through high rates of
unemployment—it is not surprising that they are also more likely to be arrested,
detained, and placed outside their homes in residential facilities.4

60%
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But do these contextual data suffi-

FIGURE 3

AFRICAN AMERICAN JUVENILES ARE ARRESTED IN NUMBERS OUT OF PROPORTION
TO THEIR REPRESENTATION IN THE GENERAL POPULATION

ciently explain why, in so many places,
the kids in the juvenile justice system,

PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ARRESTED
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and especially its secure institutions, are

Youth arrested

overwhelmingly youth of color? Are
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white kids so much less likely to be delin-
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quent? Dr. Delbert S. Elliot, Director of

60%

the Center for the Study and Prevention
of Violence, has long studied differences

40%

in the (self-reported) risk behaviors of

26
20%

white and African American youth.15
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While official arrest statistics imply that
no more than 4% of youth engage in

0%
White

African American
RACE

criminal behavior in a given year,16

Source: Yamagata, Eileen Poe and Michael A. Jones. And Justice for Some: Differential Treatment
of Minority Youth in the Justice System. Washington, DC: Building Blocks for Youth, April 2000.

Elliott’s studies show that 25% of
white youth and 36% of African

FIGURE 4

American youth were involved

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INDICATOR BY RACE 5

Social Indicator

White

in at least one “serious violent
African
American

Asian and
Pacific Islander

Hispanic

offense” (defined as aggravated

71%

26%

1%

Not available

assaults, robberies, and rapes

320

620

200

Not available

that involved a weapon) by the

Children living below the
poverty line—20007

13.5%

33.1%

11.8%

30.3%

time they were 17 years old—

Families living below the
poverty line—20008

5.7%

22.7%

9.6%

21.7%

most likely to offend. Based on

Female-headed household
below the poverty line—20009

19.8%

41.0%

23.0%

40.7%

this, Elliott suggests that delin-

High school graduates—199710

87.7%

77.6%

85.3%

57%

3.9

26.6

4.6 (1996)

12.4 (1996)

2.0%

9%

Not available

Not available

4%

9%

Not available

8%

6

14

5

6

Youth arrests—1998
Youth arrest rates: per
100,000 youth—19986

Homicides per 100,000
residents—199711
Adults under correctional
supervision—199712
Unemployment rates of persons
ages 16 and older—199713
Infant mortality rates per
100,000 residents—199514

the peak age at which a youth is

quent behavior is actually a relatively normal part of adolescence
for a large segment of American
youth across the racial divide. And
while African American youth
were a third more likely than
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white youth to commit a violent offense by the time they were 17, these differences
were not sufficient to explain the huge difference in arrest rates between white
youth and African American youth17 (see Figure 5).
Significantly, as young people reach
their 20s, African American youth who

FIGURE 5
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adulthood, effectively wiping out differences in the rates at which whites and African Americans engage in violent
behavior as young adults.18
Overall, research like Elliott’s that contrasts youth arrests and youth behavior
reveals at least four important lessons for understanding DMC and the larger social
context of minority youths’ lives:
1. “Serious” delinquent behavior is a part of growing up for one-quarter to onethird of all youth, bringing juvenile delinquency to the threshold of being normal, commonplace behavior;
2. African Americans, as teens, commit only slightly more violent crime, about the
same amount of property crime, and less drug crime than white youth;
3. In no category can the marginal differences in white and African American
behavior explain the huge disparity in arrest or incarceration rates; and
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4. Perhaps most importantly, meaningful interventions, especially those that create
opportunities for employment and positive social relationships, can alter the life
paths of delinquent youth so they can live relatively crime-free lives.
Justice System Disparities
What role do arrests and police practices play?

If the social context for youth of color puts them behind white youth at the “starting gate,” they fall further behind if they come into contact with the justice system.
In fact, many studies imply that the justice system creates new inequities. For
example, despite survey data that show that youth of color are just as likely as white
youth to admit to being in a fight, entering a building or home where they were
not supposed to be, carrying and using a weapon, or stealing something worth less
than $50,19 they are arrested at rates many times higher than are whites (see Figure
6). African American youth are arrested for drug crimes at double the rate of
whites, even though both the most recent National Institute of Drug Abuse Survey
of high school seniors and National Household Survey on Drug Abuse found
substantially higher involvement in serious drug behavior for whites than for
FIGURE 6
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African Americans (see Figure 7). The NIDA survey found that white youth
reported using heroin and cocaine at seven times the rate of African American
youth. In the National Household Survey, white youth ages 12–17 reported selling
drugs a third more frequently than African American youth.20
FIGURE 7
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The Building Blocks for Youth study, And Justice for Some, lists a variety of
potential reasons why African American youth are overrepresented in 26 out of 29
arrest categories demarcated by the FBI:
■

Individual police practices and policies may make it more likely that minority
youth are arrested (e.g., targeting patrols in low-income neighborhoods or in
racial or ethnic minority neighborhoods).

■

Where offenses happen greatly influences the potential for arrests (e.g., white
youth use and sell drugs at higher rates than African American youth, but police
arrest more youth of color probably because they can easily target street corners
in cities but not homes in the suburbs).
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■

Differential reactions of victims to offenses committed by white and minority
youth (e.g., white victims disproportionately perceive offenders to be minorities).

■

Youth exhibit different behaviors (e.g., youth of color may commit certain crimes
more frequently).

■

System personnel show overt racial bias.
Enforcement of the nation’s drug laws serves as a good case study to answer the

question, “Are the police focusing their resources on the African American
community?” As shown in Figure 7, white youth self-report using and selling drugs
at higher rates than African American youth, but African American youth are
arrested at nearly three times the rate of white youth. Data from Illinois youth drug
crime arrests offer some interesting local insights on how enforcement practices can
lead to disparity. While two-thirds of Illinois’ youth population is white, nearly
60% of Illinois youth arrested for a drug crime are African American—in a state
where African Americans make up only 15% of the youth population. This arrest
disparity is partially the result of where law enforcement resources are in the state.
While half of all Illinois youth live outside Cook County, 72% of all youth drug
arrests occur in Cook County, where three-quarters of the state’s African American
youth live.
The racial disparities in Illinois’ youth drug arrest statistics appear to be further
exacerbated by state statutes. As recounted earlier, in the 1980s Illinois legislators
changed the state’s waiver laws, making it possible for prosecutors to charge 15and 16-year-olds as adults for selling drugs within 1,000 feet of a school or public
housing project. The law had a disproportionate effect in Cook County, where the
bulk of the state’s minority youth population lives and where the concentration of
schools and housing projects is highest. Simply by virtue of living in a dense urban
setting, Chicago’s minority youth population is much more likely to be within
1,000 feet of a school or housing project than Illinois’ suburban youth population,
which is majority white. As a result, 92% of all youth automatically transferred to
adult court in Illinois were from Cook County. Eighty-eight percent of the state’s
other counties did not exclude even one youth from juvenile court under these
provisions. Within Cook County in 2000, 99% of the youth tried as adults for
drug crimes were African American or Latino.21

23

What is the impact of indigent defense on youth of color?

The only thing my lawyer ever said to me was “hush’”when I tried to tell the
judge that we don’t have a phone because the lawyer was putting me on
Electronic Monitoring. My PO told me that the lawyer wants me to plead guilty
and asked me what I was going to do. I want to get out of here so I am going to
plead in the case. —17-year-old girl in detention in Texas22
As they enter the formal justice system in higher proportions, youth of color are
more likely than white youth to rely on the overburdened indigent defense system.
According to another study by Building Blocks for Youth, Youth Crime/Adult
Time 23, white youth were twice as likely as African American youth to retain
private counsel. Further, youth represented by private attorneys were less likely to
be convicted and more likely to have their cases returned to juvenile court if they
were originally prosecuted as adults. African American youth are more likely to be
represented by indigent defenders “who are burdened by the high caseloads that
public defenders carry.”24 According to the American Bar Association, juvenile
defenders face distinct challenges: excessive caseloads; lack of resources for
independent evaluations, expert witnesses, and investigations; lack of computers,
telephones, files, and office space; lack of training; low salaries, and morale; and an
inability to keep up with rapidly changing juvenile codes.25
How does access to resources and alternatives to detention affect racial disparities?

Juvenile defenders and probation officials have complained that youth of color do
not have the family or community resources available to make them appropriate
for alternatives to detention.26 Moreover, many of these officials often believe that
a minority youth’s best chance to receive services may be in the detention system.
As one chief probation officer puts it, “The courts incarcerate kids for help. Judges
think that incarcerating them is the only way to get them treatment. The judges
cannot order CPS [Child Protective Services] or mental health to do anything, but
they can order me to do it.”27
Again, the different paths white and African American youth take after the
arrest stage when charged with drug crimes illustrates the impact of this resource
gap. While approximately half of white youth arrested for drug crimes are formally
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processed, three-quarters of drug cases involving African American youth result in
formal processing.28 Meanwhile, African Americans, who make up 33% of all
youth drug arrests, represent only 17% of the youth admitted to state-funded drug
treatment programs. White youth are generally represented in these programs in
the proportion they are arrested (see Figure 8).29 Similarly, African American youth
arrested for drug-related offenses are about one-third less likely to be diverted from
court to drug treatment than their white counterparts (see Figure 9).
FIGURE 8
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What role does racial bias among key decisionmakers play in DMC?

From the arrest stage to intake to adjudication, racial generalizations may play
a role in the often highly subjective criteria different system officials bring to their
decision-making. “Typically, judges look for red flags,” says one juvenile probation
officer. “Things that say a kid is going to re-offend . . . or whether things are okay
for the child, like whether or not they are doing well at home.” 30 For many system
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actors, their basis for evaluating
the red flags comes from experience and may be a subjective

FIGURE 9
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233 narrative reports written by
juvenile probation officers, analyzing the written judgments probation officers
made, and contrasting the rationale for their decisions with objective measures of
risk. They found that probation officers are more likely to see the crimes of youth
of color as caused by “internal forces” (e.g., personal failure, inadequate moral
character, personality) and crimes by whites as caused by “external forces” (e.g.,
poor home life, lack of appropriate role models, environment).31 Probation officers’
interpretations of subjective factors like a youth’s remorse or cooperativeness
ultimately influenced the officer’s assessments that the delinquent behavior of
minority youth was the result of individual failings (unmitigated by larger social
forces) for which state intervention was the only recourse.
Bridges and Steen point to a powerful example of the subjective decision
making process when they describe the way one probation officer sees two 17-yearold boys (Ed and Lou), who both have no prior criminal history and are charged
with first-degree robbery.
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This robbery was very dangerous as Ed confronted the victim with a loaded
shotgun. He pointed it at the victim and demanded money be placed in a paper
bag. . . . There is an adult quality to this referral. In talking with Ed, what was
evident was the relaxed and open way he discussed his lifestyle. There didn’t seem
to be any desire to change. There was no expression of remorse from the young
man. There was no moral content to his comment. — About Ed, an African
American youth, who robbed a gas station with two friends

Lou is the victim of a broken home. He is trying to be his own man, but . . . is
seemingly easily misled and follows other delinquents against his better judgment.
Lou is a tall emaciated little boy who is terrified by his present predicament. It
appears that he is in need of drug/alcohol evaluation and treatment. — About Lou,
a white youth, who robbed two motels at gunpoint

The bias of system personnel is predictably fed and amplified by the gap in
communication between white decisionmakers and the youth of color they see.
Unfamiliar body language, for example, can be easily interpreted in ways that
negatively impact judgments about youth of color:
I’m expecting when they come to court they’re going to show some measure of
deference towards the court and not walk in with an attitude. How are we to feel
that it’s appropriate to release the kid who has absolutely no respect for the court,
for the law enforcement, for the attorney, for the cop on the street, for our laws
obviously. — A court official32

The frustration exhibited by court officials is mirrored by youth, who are also
alienated by the communication gap and who may sense that the system has
already made up its mind about them. In many instances, African American youth
perceive that white youth are treated differently, increasing their lack of faith in the
justice system:
Cops is more scared of African Americans. Because we just don’t be caring, you
know. The cops are everywhere. They’ve been messing with you so long, it’s like,
you know. . . . I don’t care no more. — interview with African American youth33
Denying DMC?

Perhaps the greatest barrier to ending bias in the justice system is the very denial
that it exists at all—denial that often permeates the system, from federal policy-
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makers to local line staff. In 1999, when the very federal legislation that led states
to collect data on DMC was being re-authorized, Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-UT), then
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, argued that justice system disparities
simply did not exist:
Should they not be convicted when they sell drugs to our kids? Everybody knows
that it happens. I haven’t heard one shred of information that proves there is
discrimination here. When you prove that, I will be right there, side by side with
you.34

A couple of months after Sen. Hatch made his statement, The Salt Lake City
Tribune, reporting on the release of DMC data in Hatch’s home state, wrote,
Minority youths in Utah are nine to 41 times more likely to be arrested than their
Caucasian counterparts — and almost always receive harsher penalties, despite
sentencing guidelines meant to ensure parity. . . . The study is more evidence that
racial disparities exist in the state’s justice system, a claim long held by Utah
minorities.35
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Chapter 4

EFFORTS TO REDUCE RACIAL DISPARITIES
IN DETENTION IN THE JDAI SITES
Strategies for Addressing DMC in Detention
n 1993, the Annie E. Casey Foundation held one of its semi-annual conferences

I

for delegations from the five1 original JDAI sites to strategize about ways to

promote juvenile detention reform in their systems. At this particular conference,

participants spent an afternoon discussing how DMC figured into larger detention
reform strategies and what might be done to reduce racial disparities. The discussions that afternoon were difficult. Participants came with different understandings
of the role race played in juvenile justice and in the larger American context. Site
reports revealed that little had been done locally to figure out how disparities in
detention might be addressed.
Foundation staff felt self-critical following these meetings for having been
insufficiently helpful in providing site teams with starting points for the DMC
work. For example, they acknowledged that the very detailed guide developed for
the sites to prepare their reform plans was virtually silent on specific strategies that
might be utilized to reduce racial disparities. As a consequence, a lengthy memo
was written and distributed to the sites both to clarify Foundation thinking about
DMC in detention and to suggest some DMC-specific strategies for consideration.
In establishing objectives, the memo stated:
Clearly, JDAI will not result in the eradication of racism, poverty, and other
powerful social forces that contribute to the current racial composition of detention
centers. Detention reform, however, should seek to eliminate systemic bias so that
the juvenile justice system does not exacerbate or contribute to the impact of those
forces. . . . Detention reform that effectively addresses over-representation of
minorities in secure facilities should accomplish at least two measurable changes:
(1) the rates at which minority youth are detained should decline and (2) the
number of minority youth in detention (at a point in time and over time)
should decline.

31

To achieve these two objectives, the memo noted, reducing disparity should be
central to the sites’ detention reform efforts, informing both the design and implementation of the “core” population management strategies (already presented to
the sites), as well as the development of DMC-specific strategies.
The “core” population management strategies (described in detail in Pathways
3, 4, 5 and 9) were:
1. Objective admissions screening instruments;
2. New or enhanced alternatives-to-detention programs;
3. Expedited case processing to reduce lengths of stay;
4. New policies and practices for probation violations, warrants, and “awaitingplacement” cases.
JDAI’s designers believed that if sites developed objective, risk-based approaches
to decide who would be admitted to detention, the large number of low- and
medium-risk youth common in most detention center populations would be
reduced. These youngsters would be served by communitybased, nonsecure options. By moving cases through the courts
more quickly, lengths of stay would be reduced, and program
slots would turn over more quickly (therefore, allowing more
youth to participate). Developing noncustodial sanctions for
rule violators, new categories of warrants that did not mandate
detention, and more efficient placement techniques would all
work to reduce bed occupancy. If sites were successful in implementing these core strategies, the reasoning went, they should
see reductions in the number of youth of color in their detention

In other places,
detention reform had
actually increased
the percentage of
minority youth in
detention because
the first to benefit
from the reforms
were white youth.

facilities simply as a function of overall decreases in utilization. (This was not a radical
assumption, because the proportion of youth of color in these facilities was so high.)
At the same time, however, Foundation staff warned that, in other places,
detention reform had actually increased the percentage of minority youth in
detention because the first to benefit from the reforms were white youth. It was
necessary, therefore, for sites to go beyond the core strategies and to develop DMCspecific ones that would maximize the likelihood that racial disparities could be
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reduced. Unfortunately, there proved to be a dearth of well-researched, practical
innovations to recommend to the sites. Still, the memo identified 10 strategies that
the sites might consider in their efforts to minimize DMC. This was not intended
to be an exhaustive list. Rather, the memo’s authors mainly hoped that these ideas
would stimulate more creativity at the local level. The 10 strategies suggested were:
1. Formulate a vision and related policy goals;
2. Create structures (e.g., task forces) charged with sustaining a focus on DMC;
3. Collect data and conduct research to document where disparity occurs;
4. Build coalitions and alliances with communities and people of color;
5. Diversify the composition of the system’s work force;
6. Diversify the service delivery system by contracting with organizations located
in neighborhoods and managed by people of color;
7. Provide cultural and racial sensitivity training for staff at all levels of every
agency of the system;
8. Minimize opportunities for discriminatory decisions by creating objective
instruments and guidelines free of racial bias;
9. Improve defense representation to increase advocacy for youth of color;
10. Change the policies and practices of other systems (e.g., mental health, child
welfare) to prevent “dumping” youth better served by those systems into secure
detention.
Despite the potential menu of options juvenile detention reformers could
pursue in their jurisdictions, stateholders involved in efforts to reduce disparity at
the five JDAI sites expressed great frustration at the weight of the challenges facing
them. One member of the Cook County effort noted, “When 90% of the kids in
detention are kids of color, it was hard to know what to do other than to get the
police out of the city, and send them to arrest kids in the suburbs.”2 Another
member involved early in Sacramento County’s efforts remarked, “We got too
lost in talking about explaining the whole American experience around racism
and poverty.”3
Because many of the reasons for DMC are beyond the direct reach of the
juvenile justice system, it is easy to “get lost” in the complex global and historical
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issues that cause racial disparities in detention. Yet, the lessons learned in Cook,
Sacramento, and Multnomah Counties, which are being applied directly in two
promising new sites — Santa Cruz, California, and King County (Seattle),
Washington—have taught the field how to begin to address the web of issues
connected to DMC.
Cook County, Illinois
Census Context
In 2000, 32% of youth population were African American, 27% were Latino, and 34% were
white.

Detention Context
In 2000, Cook County’s detention population was 74.1% African American, 15.9% Latino,
and 7.8% White (see also Figure 10). While the proportion of racial and ethnic minorities in
detention did not change much since the start of the JDAI efforts, the number of minority
youth in detention in Cook County dropped 31% between 1996 and 2000.

Background

Cook County’s strategy for addressing DMC began with their establishment of a
“Disproportionate Representation Committee,” a structure that was chaired by a
presiding judge (for community relations) and included representatives of court
services and probation, the public defender, juvenile detention and, at times, the
police and state’s attorney. The committee also included community-based groups
like the Westside Association for Community Action and advocacy groups like
Northwestern University Law School’s Children and Family Justice Center. The
committee developed specific goals related to DMC, including “to research reasons
for overrepresentation of minorities and revise policies, procedures, practices, and
programs as necessary.”
However, from the beginning, this committee’s limitations began to reveal
themselves. For example, there was early disagreement among key players in Cook
County about whether larger societal factors, rather than the conduct, policies, and
practices of the system and its personnel, were responsible for DMC. Police and
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probation officials believed that explicit DMC reduction goals could be best
achieved by promoting a more effective detention system for all youth.4 Also, from
the outset, police officials were reluctant to turn over data to help analyze specific
system decision points. The lack of arrest data made it impossible to consider
significant alterations to police practices. Because the overwhelming majority of
youth presented to detention by police
FIGURE 10

were kids of color, this shortcoming

IN COOK COUNTY, AFRICAN AMERICANS ENTERED THE DETENTION SYSTEM AT
15 TIMES THE RATE OF WHITES IN 1998
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Sources: American FactFinder Quick Tables. Race, Hispanic or Latino and Age: 2000 for Cook
County. U.S. Census Bureau. Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initial Evaluation Report (Draft).
Oakland, CA: National Council on Crime and Delinquency (December 2000). Note: These rates
were calculated using youth population estimates from 2000, as countywide youth population data
for each year was unavailable. Latinos were excluded due to varying definitions of ethnicity.

dropped before they came to trial,5
needlessly detaining youth who the
state would not even successfully adjudicate. In 1996, a new state’s attorney
was elected who was more supportive

of JDAI efforts and who did help contribute to policies that reduced the size of the
detention population.
When it became clear that key participants had significant disagreements
regarding the very definition of the problem, the committee changed its focus
from addressing “overrepresentation” to building “diversity” and creating a more
effective system “for all kids.” As Mike Rohan, Director of Juvenile Probation and
Court Services for the Circuit Court of Cook County put it,
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We made it our goal to reduce the number of kids detained and to help kids who
are detained to have better outcomes. Reducing disparity was a larger, implicit
goal of all our work. I think what you want to have is less kids in detention.
Reducing disparity was never an explicit goal, because it was an overarching goal.
Almost all the kids in our programs are children of color.6
Strategies to Reduce DMC

As a practical strategy, acceptable to virtually everyone, the DMC committee
decided to use cultural diversity and communication training as a way to build
sensitivity in the systems’ agencies and staff. With the help of an external
consultant provided by the Casey Foundation,7 Cook County developed a “trainthe-trainer” model to create organizational capacity for staff training in each
agency. This model focused on racial stereotypes, bias in decision-making, and the
impact of the actors’ roles in the decision-making process. Sixty people from the
six collaborating offices were part of the trainings. Judge Sophia H. Hall, who
chaired the committee, reported the key benefits of the effort and the specific
benefit of the model:
The benefits of our offices collaborating to develop this cultural diversity management training are the things we learn from each other about how we are perceived
and the help we can give to each other through the dynamic of our interaction.
This dynamic sharpens communication within the training and quells the finger
pointing and defensiveness about our conduct and decision-making.8

Rohan saw the trainings as a very important first step in “fostering a positive
culture and more appropriate values.” Since 1997, six offices—the police department, the judiciary, the public defender, the juvenile detention center, the state’s
attorney, and juvenile probation and court services—have trained staff.
Consistent with the notion that reducing racial disparities was, in effect, an
implicit goal of detention reform in a system with overwhelmingly minority
detainees, Cook County’s JDAI efforts focused primarily on core detention reforms
to reduce the number of kids of color in detention. Members of the JDAI steering
committee developed a new risk assessment tool for detention intake, bringing
considerations about race into the new point-scale system. For example, factors

36

EFFORTS TO REDUCE RACIAL DISPARITIES IN DETENTION IN THE JDAI SITES

that previously increased the points for minority youth—such as whether a youth
had two parents versus another guardian who could hold the youth accountable—
were re-weighted. The designers of this tool sought both to improve the outcomes
for all youth and to be more sensitive to the context of minority youth’s lives, by
reducing the points allocated for criteria more commonly associated with minority
arrestees (like prior police contacts and whether a youth came from a single-parent
household). As a result of this kind of DMC-sensitive thinking, prior arrests were
not counted in the scoring of the detention-screening instrument, only prior
referrals to court.
Cook County tried to address the gap in the quality of defense that minority
youth received through the indigent defense system. In July 1996, the Public
Defender’s Office established the Detention Response Unit, consisting of two
paralegals who interviewed detained youth prior to their custody hearing. The
paralegals verified community ties and contacted families to stress the importance
of their presence at the custody hearing. These paralegals also provided the youth
with important information about what would happen at the hearing, what to
expect, and how to conduct themselves. The results of the interviews with the
children, including discrepancies about the police version of the instant offense, or
risk assessment factors, were relayed to the public defender conducting hearings
that day. The paralegals also suggested alternative to detention programs that the
lawyers might recommend to the court. By adding a larger social narrative to the
court process—one that resource-poor public defenders could not often marshal—
the Detention Response Unit aimed to provide judges with a better understanding
of each youth’s circumstances and a greater array of community-based alternatives
where youth could be supervised.
Cook County’s most distinguishing detention reform strategy that was informed
by the need to improve minority youth outcomes was its development of a continuum of detention alternatives. These alternatives had a substantial impact on
reducing the number of admissions and average daily population in secure detention. As important perhaps, they ushered in a new era of closer relationships
between the juvenile justice system and communities of color. Prior to JDAI, contracts with minority-run community-based organizations for services to delinquent
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youth were rare. Now they are commonplace, and the system’s service delivery
capacities have been greatly expanded and made more culturally competent.
Perhaps the most innovative of the six programs developed were the Evening
Reporting Centers (ERC) (see Figure 11). The ERCs are operated by nonprofit
community-based organizations located in high-referral neighborhoods for youth
of color. The length of participation in the program ranges from five to 21 days. It
is intended as an interim measure to reduce the risk of re-offending through
intense, individualized supervision during the “high-crime” hours (from 3:00 p.m.
to 9:00 p.m.) on weekdays and on Saturday while delinquency proceedings are
pending. Other goals of the ERCs are to ensure appearance in court while allowing youths to continue their schooling and remain at home.
The first ERC began with a capacity for 20 and was quickly replicated to the
current seven centers serving 165 youth who would otherwise be detained. (In
September 2001, Cook County established a gender-responsive ERC for girls.)
A recent evaluation of the Cook County initiative concluded that 60% of youth
admitted to the ERCs in 1997 would have been admitted to secure detention if the
programs were not in place.9
The ERCs were a direct product of
the county’s JDAI work, influenced by
increased thought about how to create
programs that meet the cultural needs of

FIGURE 11

COOK COUNTY ERCs

Staff: Operated by nonprofit, community-based service organizations that hire and
train staff primarily from the neighborhood; centers maintain a ratio of one staff to
five youth.

of people that would make these

Program elements:
1. Six hours of daily supervision, tutoring, counseling, and recreation.
2. Curfew checks.
3. Evening meals and transportation home.
4. Youths referred for additional recreational, educational, and vocational
opportunities in the community.
5. Work with families.
6. Collateral checks on school attendance and school work.
7. Program supervision enhanced by linking participants to home confinement
program and/or electronic monitoring.

programs work. Because of the trainings,

Eligibility criteria: Secure-detention-eligible youths; chronic violation of probation.

the courts saw the particular value these

Length of stay in program: 21–30 days.

groups brought to detention reform.

Cost: Approximately $33 per youth per day.

minority youth. Ernie Jenkins, Executive
Director of the Westside Association for
Community Action, the community
group that implemented the first ERC,
said that JDAI brought together the kind

Jenkins described the transformation in
these relationships:

Successful completion rate: 90% of youth make their court hearings and remain
arrest-free while in the program.
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The coalition helped us to see the whole child’s needs, and our participation in the
coalition changed other agencies’ practices, too. The single most important thing
was there was an advisory board, which invited groups like us in to make us part
of the process. For the first time, we went over to the police station to get to know
the beat officer and built some good relationships. Before, probation would call us
and check in with the kids. Now, they have permanently assigned staff to our
center, meaning there is no delay in the delivery of services or program. The good
working relationship we built with probation has kept the program running
smoothly.10

Rohan feels that the most important achievement of the DMC committee was
the fruit born by their initial outreach:
We approached religious groups and community groups that were with us from the
outset. . . . When we applied for and received federal grants to fund specific diversion programs coming out of our JDAI work, we could say to a funder, “we are
working with a network of grassroots community groups to make these programs
work for these kids.” 11
Analysis of Success and Challenges

Cook County’s cultural sensitivity trainings seem to have contributed to sparking
a series of actions that resulted in a more-informed development of core detention
strategies, such as alternative programs like ERCs and the revisions of the risk
assessment instrument (RAI). Important programmatic developments might not
have happened had system officials not developed new coalitions with community
groups and service providers that could diversify the kinds of services available to
detained youth. As a result of these broader detention reform strategies, influenced
by DMC discussions, Cook County succeeded in reducing its average daily detention population from 694 in 1996 to 478 in 2000 (Figure 12). In a jurisdiction
where more than 90% of the youth admitted and held in detention are youth of
color, a 31% drop in the detention population benefited primarily minority youth.
But is making the juvenile detention system more effective overall the same as
addressing overrepresentation? Reducing racial disparities was seen by Cook
County as an implicit goal of detention reform in part, it seems, because the
participants could not collectively agree on a definition of the problem. Cook
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County’s DMC efforts,
while restricted by these

FIGURE 12:

COOK COUNTY’S AVERAGE DAILY POPULATION DECREASED BY 31%, 1996–2000
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Source: Cook County Probation Department, 2001.

program development in
particular. Today, there are far fewer youth of color in detention in Cook County.
However, the proportion of youth of color in detention is about the same as it was
before JDAI began. Overall then, Cook County stands out as a detention reform
success that improved outcomes for youth of color. It is unclear, however, whether
it could have been even more successful had it focused more explicitly on specific
DMC reduction strategies.
Sacramento County, California
Census Context
In 2000, Whites made up 46% of the youth population; Latinos, 22%; African Americans,
12%; and Asians, 12%.

Detention Context
In 1997, 34% of the youth admitted to detention were African American, 35% were White,
19% were Latino, and 12% were Asian (see also Figure 13).

Background

The primary vehicle for addressing racial disparities in Sacramento County was the
“Task Force on Fairness,” which was set up by the larger JDAI collaborative. It was
led by the presiding juvenile court judge and involved probation, the district
attorney, the public defender, health and human services and, early on, the police
department. Like Cook County, the Sacramento effort worked hard from the
beginning to get a wide variety of community-based organizations around the
table, including groups from the county’s large Asian, Pacific Islander, and Latino
communities. The goals of Sacramento’s task force were to research and examine
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the issues relating to racial disparities in detention, to build new coalitions and
alliances with groups to broaden the perspective of the system to deal with DMC,
and to provide decisionmakers with training and tools to address overrepresentation.
To accomplish the goal of examining and documenting the causes of DMC in
the system, task force researchers developed a “cultural audit” survey to be filled
out by judges, probation officers, deputy sheriffs, assistant district attorneys, and
public defenders. The purpose of the
FIGURE 13

IN SACRAMENTO COUNTY, AFRICAN AMERICANS ENTERED THE DETENTION SYSTEM
AT 4 TIMES THE RATE OF WHITES IN 1998
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Sources: American FactFinder Quick Tables. Race, Hispanic or Latino and Age: 2000 for Sacramento.
U.S. Census Bureau. Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initial Evaluation Report (Draft). Oakland, CA:
National Council on Crime and Delinquency (December 2000). Note: These rates were calculated
using youth population estimates from 2000, as countywide youth population data for each year was
unavailable. Latinos were excluded due to varying definitions between detention and census data.

About 300 surveys were returned.
Survey analysis revealed that most
of the key decisionmakers and frontline staff were older and white, that
there was an “us versus them” men-

tality between departments, that respondents had little understanding of the
systemic problem of DMC, and that many of these decisionmakers were not “culturally competent” to deal with the diverse youth of Sacramento.12 “By cultural
competency, we mean, for example, that there were complaints that Asian youth
were disrespectful, looking down when they were before the courts,” says Gerald
E. Root, the early project manager for the initiative. “But for Asians, a person looking down is a sign of submission to authority, not disrespect.” The information
gathered in the cultural audit provided the basis for cultural diversity trainings.13
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As the audit results were compiled and the task force prepared its research
agenda, Sacramento’s attempts to keep the police department part of the task force
were affected by external events. Local controversy around police practices, particularly among African Americans, had led to public protests by the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People. At the same time, the county
sheriff ’s cooperation with another research effort around race in the criminal
justice system was used in a lawsuit against the department. As such, law enforcement was not disposed to participate in any more research efforts around race, and
the police department left the task force. While the probation department
remained part of the effort, it became defensive about the lack of participation by
law enforcement, complaining that it would be unfairly singled out in the study of
the problem. “Our biggest barrier was resistance from law enforcement and that
resistance pointed us toward looking at prevention,” says Root. “We were philosophically driven upstream.” That is, because the task force could not address the
racial disparities that began at the arrest stage, they focused instead on factors that
might reduce the chances that youth would even be arrested. The focus became
primary delinquency prevention, a worthwhile goal no doubt, but not one likely
to quickly reduce the numbers of youth of color in the juvenile hall.
Strategies to Reduce DMC

Without the assistance of law enforcement, Sacramento’s researchers assessed what
was happening before youth were arrested that might be causing DMC. New data,
drawn from the results of a survey sent to 679 youth in juvenile hall, community
schools, and public schools illuminated the larger social context of DMC:
Factors that correlate to a high risk of entering the juvenile justice system include
poor attitude regarding school, use of tobacco and other drugs, and a lack of
involvement in positive, extracurricular activities for non-minority as well as
minority students. . . . Minority juveniles are generally from lower economic
backgrounds . . . and do not believe that their teachers push them to be the best
that they can be.14

The data collected by the task force was shared with another community-based
initiative that had administered the same survey to over 2,000 students in public
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schools and then used to inform a series of community forums. Participants began
discussing how to set up services and partnerships to reduce drug use, child abuse,
and even smoking. While a new coalition between juvenile justice and other
agencies could have increased both the delivery and diversity of services available
to prevent youth from being dumped into the detention system, no specific
juvenile justice policy changes emerged from moving this agenda “upstream.”
Interestingly, those efforts were effective, however, in mobilizing parents’ participation in school and community-based asset mapping and prevention program
development in the county.15
An additional spin-off from the work of the Task Force on Fairness was the
establishment of an annual conference on multicultural family violence prevention.
It is designed to bring together the justice, health and human service providers, and
the minority communities to improve communication and understanding and to
provide awareness of and access to support resources. Five annual two-day conferences have been held in Sacramento, drawing approximately 450 people each to
discuss the conflicts among new immigrants’ and other minorities’ cultural traditions, social norms, and the legal processes in society.
In a more direct effort to affect juvenile detention operations, the task force also
held a series of cultural diversity trainings for staff across departments, including
probation. While the two-day trainings began as “gripe sessions,” Root says they
succeeded in getting different staff to understand the larger issue of DMC and
promoted information sharing within the different departments. “People finally
understood this is why they made me fill out that form,” Root says. “The trainings
also had the effect of keeping DMC on the front burner and made people think
about it when addressing demographic change within their departments, when
examining hiring decisions, and decisionmaking tools.”
By the end of 1996, 111 representatives from juvenile court, probation, public
defender, sheriff, and district attorney offices had participated in cultural diversity
training. A survey of the participants showed that 90% of men and 99% of women
agreed or strongly agreed that the training increased their knowledge of intercultural communication, and 85% of men and 89% of women agreed or strongly
agreed that the trainings improved their job skills. There was strong support for the
training across ethnic and racial groups.
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Sacramento County also used grant funds to hire a case advocate in the public
defender’s office. This person’s responsibilities included providing new or enhanced
information about detained delinquents and developing release or dispositional
plans to facilitate their release from secure custody. As in other jurisdictions, the
theory here was that enhanced advocacy would benefit youth of color, who were
almost exclusively represented by overburdened public defenders. This experiment,
however, proved unsuccessful. The case advocate had a difficult time identifying
youth for whom her interventions might make a difference, especially because the
probation department was considered the most authoritative source of such information and options in this court system. When the impact of the case advocate was
assessed, the JDAI collaborative found that it had not made a difference in reducing detention utilization, and funding was terminated.
While Sacramento engaged in several strategies aimed specifically at reducing
DMC (e.g., forming a task force, conducting research, participating in new coalitions, and enhancing defense advocacy), it was the core JDAI strategies that were
used to impact the size of the detention population and that may have impacted
disparity in the detention system. Sacramento’s most innovative efforts were aimed
at reducing lengths of stay by speeding the resolution of cases. The county
established specific “fast tracks” for certain cases, and it staffed an expeditor position
that sought to divert youth from the detention facility as quickly as possible.
Sacramento County also developed an RAI to guide admission decisions, but when
it was reviewed and contrasted with previous practices, “we found no difference
between what we were doing and what was originally practiced by probation officers
and intake people. The only impact it had on the system was validating it.” 16
Similarly, few new programmatic alliances were established as a result of JDAI. In
fact, most new or enhanced detention alternative programs established during
these years were probation operated.
Analysis of Success and Challenges

An analysis by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD) has
shown that, between 1994 and 1998, the proportion and number of African
American admissions to detention dropped slightly, from 37% of all admissions to
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34%, while Latino admissions remained about the same (during a time when both
groups’ proportions in the youth population increased).17 More importantly,
research prepared for the Task Force by NCCD showed that, although there were
disparities for African Americans and Latinos at the arrest stage, the proportion of
youth of color at various other stages in the system did not change. In other words,
while Sacramento could not show that their detention system reduced the disparities seen at arrest, they were not making the disparities any worse either. This information, combined with the resistance to internal system changes, altered the focus
of the Sacramento task force to research on broader factors contributing to DMC:
While the language of the JJDP Act specifically refers to juveniles who are
“detained or confined,” minority over-representation is often a product of actions
that occur at earlier points in the juvenile justice system. Due to the absence of
clarity on the causal factors for disproportionate minority confinement in the
county, and the desire to provide appropriate intervention strategies, the Criminal
Justice Cabinet directed the interagency Task Force on Fairness (now renamed
Disproportionate Minority Confinement Research Committee) to conduct
comprehensive research that examines current scientific literature and data, and
identifies causal variables in Sacramento County.18

Sacramento’s research agenda took it in a different direction, “upstream.” The
task force focused on what factors in the communities were causing or contributing
to disparate rates of delinquency across races. With those results, it joined a larger
effort to involve community groups in designing new policies and programs to
prevent delinquency (and, therefore, to reduce DMC). These attempts to develop
a neighborhood response to DMC were well received by community groups and
schools, but it is hard to tell to whether justice system stakeholders really liked this
broader prevention focus because it “got them off the hook.”19 This strategy might
even have eventually expanded and diversified the delinquency prevention service
delivery system. For now, however, little evidence can be found that these efforts
have altered disparities in the flow of cases into the juvenile justice system.
Sacramento’s relatively successful cultural diversity training for system decisionmakers and front-line staff seems to have helped put DMC on the front burner and
gave juvenile justice system staff a chance to critically re-evaluate their practices
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with an eye toward cultural bias. Combined with the focus on DMC created by
the Task Force on Fairness, its research efforts, and increased interaction with new
community partners, the county succeeded at least in reducing or eliminating
disparities at case-processing points following arrest. This is not an insignificant
accomplishment given that prior to JDAI Sacramento’s juvenile justice system
added to disproportionality at every decision point, resulting ultimately in higher
percentages of African American youth entering into long-term incarceration in
the California Youth Authority. As in some other sites, however, tangible and
meaningful reductions in disparity at the point of arrest, and therefore at intake
and detention, remains an elusive goal in Sacramento.
One key lesson to be learned from Sacramento’s approach is that its efforts to
reduce DMC were affected by a combination of external events, like the
controversy swirling around the police and the fact that their research drove them
toward a “macro systemwide examination” 20 rather than the detention system. A
survey of the DMC committee suggests that Task Force members may have tried
to do too much at one time, that the portrayal of DMC might have made people
too defensive to remain part of the effort, and that more effort should have been
made to address law enforcement’s concerns. “When the police backed out,
eventually that would lead to the sheriff and probation backing out, and then the
project was no longer a systemic examination but necessarily focused on the
remaining system players,” says Root.
Changes in leadership were also very hard barriers to overcome. When, in short
order, a new chief probation officer was selected, a new sheriff elected, and a new
presiding judge seated, agency investment and support for the initiative suffered.
When passion for detention reform in general decreased, it became even harder to
sustain an intense focus on reducing racial disparities.
John Rhoads, the former deputy chief probation officer in Sacramento during
its most innovative JDAI period, says that the county’s key error was that they “did
not spend enough time focusing on taking responsibility for things that they had
direct control over.” The lessons from Sacramento were subsequently brought to
bear in Rhoads’ attempts to address the same issues in Santa Cruz, California.
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Santa Cruz, California
Census Context
In 1997, 31% of youth ages 10–17 were Latino, 63% were white, and 1.4% were African
American.

Detention Context
In 1997, Latino youth represented 64% of the youth detained; 28% were white, and 7% were
African American.

Background

The challenges faced by Sacramento’s DMC Task Force on Fairness were front and
center in John Rhoads’ mind when he took over the Santa Cruz County Probation
Department in 1997. While initiating a task force partnered with the county’s
Latino Strategic Planning Collaborative and Latino Affairs Commission, the
probation department also elected to engage in a departmental process to address
DMC. In a community where Latinos made up one-third of the youth population
but two-thirds of the detention population, the probation department knew which
key demographic group it would need to focus on to reduce racial disparities in
detention.
In this effort, the probation department drew on the experience of national
experts (including organizations like the Youth Law Center and the Southwest Key
Program) to help it explore and explain the complexities of DMC. A core working
group, which involved people from across the probation department, was soon
developed. The working group formulated a “Disproportionate Minority
Confinement Checklist”—a work plan of things they thought needed to be done
to address disparity in detention (see Figure 14).
As in some other jurisdictions, the probation department conducted research
and found that minority youth brought to juvenile hall by law enforcement had
more serious offense histories and more risk factors (like single-parent homes,
low household incomes) than white youth. To solve some of these problems,
however, one would have to improve the social and economic conditions of their
communities. “We knew that we had little control over these aspects of their lives,”
says Judith Cox, Assistant Chief of Probation.
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Instead, the probation department focused on examining its own policies,
procedures, and programs to identify things over which it did have control. By
conducting internal audits and collecting data at each decision-making point, they
mapped out where the system did not work for youth of color:
When we looked for clients who experience barriers to service or lack of access, we
found them. When we looked for points where subjective rather than objective
decisions were made, we found them. When we looked for examples of cultural
insensitivity, we found them. When we looked for unnecessary delays, which
contributed to longer length of stays in detention, we found them. — Judith A.
Cox21
Strategies to Reduce DMC

The department began by ensuring that everyone made the reduction of DMC a
key organizational objective. Diversity became the catchword everywhere, from
personnel practices, including recruitment, hiring, and training, to examining all
practices in the search for bias. Then, data were gathered on a quarterly basis to
count who was being arrested, booked, detained, and placed in programs to
measure exactly where overrepresentation occurred in their processes.
Some of the most important changes to affect DMC were rooted in the core
detention reform strategies. When Santa Cruz began weekend intake procedures,
for example, many more minimum- and medium-risk youth were released in more
timely fashion. While this reform impacted white and Latino youth at the same rate,
it had the effect of immediately reducing the number of Latino youth detained and
helped to bring down the average daily population of the detention center.
Santa Cruz found that the lack of Spanish-speaking staff at the intake and case
management stages made it difficult to move youth back to their families. In
response, the department made it a goal to have at least as many Latino or Spanishspeaking staff as the proportion of such youth in the detention center. Now, when
Latino youth are brought to detention, their families receive a call from an intake
officer who speaks Spanish: The opportunity to return a youth home is not hampered
by the inability of probation staff to speak to the parents. “Recognizing that 46% of
our caseload was Latino, we made it a goal to have 42%, or thereabouts, Latino
staff,” says Cox. Thirty-three percent of Santa Cruz’s officers are now bicultural.
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A survey of the department’s services showed that one of its diversion programs
was not being selected by Latino youth, who were instead opting for traditional
court processing, including detention. The department looked for barriers and

Now, when
Latino youth are
brought to
detention, their
families receive
a call from an
intake officer
who speaks
Spanish.

determined that the diversion program was not culturally appropriate,
then developed an additional program that was better suited to the needs
of Latino youth. Getting diversion right for the Latino population was a
key piece of the detention reform puzzle. Santa Cruz determined that, if
it did not address barriers to diversion, Latino youth would be propelled
deeper into the system, frequently with a diversion failure on their record
that was more due to the department’s inability to provide culturally
appropriate interventions than youths’ true risk of re-offending. Since
beginning their DMC effort, Santa Cruz probation officials have succeeded in more than doubling the number of youth diverted to new

programs, many of which were designed to meet specific regional needs across the
county and specially designed to meet the needs of Latino youth.
Another key problem was that Latino youth were underrepresented in the
department’s (otherwise effective) detention alternatives programs. The department knew that parental involvement and supervision was a key to successful home
detention programs, but language differences, transportation problems, confusion
about court processes and their court-related responsibilities all made it difficult for
Latino parents to participate effectively. By adding a community-based agency as a
partner in the department’s home supervision and electronic monitoring programs,
Santa Cruz was able to remove some of these barriers and help parents understand
their roles and the court’s expectations.
Santa Cruz took also examined how its post-disposition youth were fairing. The
department found that Latino boys were failing to complete a court-ordered
residential treatment program and, consequently, were being returned to detention
as probation violators. By working with the local community provider, Santa Cruz
was able to were able to improve success rates in the treatment program by ensuring
it had bilingual staff that reflected the demographics of the county and the youth
served. The department also looked to spread the continuum of services available
for youth to distant parts of the county, where previously police and probation had
limited options besides detention.
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Analysis of Success and Challenges

As the checklist shows, the Santa Cruz probation department working group on
DMC completed 19 of 23 goals from its original work plan; the rest are “in
progress and under development.” Santa Cruz succeeded in setting up an internal
structure for pressing ahead with DMC goals, set a clear list of goals, collected data
to figure out where disparity occurred within the probation system, diversified the
workforce, and examined every tool and program they ran or were involved with
for cultural bias. Santa Cruz is still working to ensure that they have clear and
objective criteria for removing kids from intensive caseloads and are developing
administrative sanctioning alternatives for youth who violate probation. As they
follow their own internal checklist, probation personnel continue to be part of
larger effort to reduce disparity through the task force. The department’s work with
FIGURE 14

SANTA CRUZ PROBATION DEPARTMENT DMC CHECKLIST.
SANTA CRUZ COUNTY PROBATION
Disproportionate Minority Confinement Work Plan Checklist

Stated administrative value
Working group charged with outcomes
Cultural competency coordinator
Cultural competency plan
Regular cultural competency training
Staff reflects bilingual, bicultural levels of client base
Key positions have bilingual staff
Key decision points mapped
Data available for each decision point
Quarterly review of decision point data (trends)
Customer surveys identify service barriers
Parental involvement at all levels
Detention alternatives with community partners and more than one level of alternative
Tracking outcomes of alternatives by ethnicity
Risk-based detention criteria without racial bias
Stakeholders involved in development of risk assessment instrument
Efficient court and placement system with short length of stay in detention—Measure
length of stay by ethnicity
Clear criteria for assignment to intensive caseloads
Clear criteria for removal from intensive caseloads
Administrative sanctions for probation violations
Sufficient diversion options
Extensive graduated continuum of services with wrap around services and community partners
Culturally competent residential programs
Source: Santa Cruz Probation Department, 2000.
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the county’s Latino Strategic Planning Collaborative and Latino Affairs Commission has already helped it build new community partnerships to set up the new
diversion programs.
What impact did these changes have on racial disparities in the detention system? In 1997, 64% of the youth in Santa Cruz’s juvenile hall on any given day
were Latino. By 1999, the Latino representation in the juvenile hall population
dropped to 53%, and in 2000, it dropped to 50% — a 22% decline in 2.5 years
(Figure 15). Over roughly the same time span, the detention rate for Latinos was
reduced by 43%, while the rate for white youth rose slightly (see Figure 16). During
that same time, the juvenile detention center average daily population dropped
from 49 to 37 — about a 25% reduction. These significant changes in the proportion of Latinos held in detention constitute an important success for Santa
Cruz and, if they hold over time, provide lessons for other communities.
The Santa Cruz Probation Department’s efforts to reduce racial disparities in
juvenile detention make it abundantly clear that single agencies can make a measurable impact on the rates at which youth of color are detained. Unlike other
JDAI sites, which all tried inter-agency approaches to
FIGURE 15

reduce DMC, the Santa Cruz Probation Department

PERCENTAGE OF THE DETENTION POPULATION THAT WAS LATINO
DROPPED 22% BETWEEN 1997 AND 2000

focused on itself and changed the policies, programs,
and practices over which it had direct control. Its
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top-echelon leaders made racial disparities in deten-
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tion their priority and used both their formal and

70%

informal authority to focus agency staff on strategies
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to reduce DMC. One has to wonder how deep the
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reductions in racial disparities might be if every
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agency in juvenile justice pursued these same goals

30%

with the same vigor. But will those agencies under-

20%

take these types of self-critical examinations, or

10%

implement changes to their own policies and prac-
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Source: Santa Cruz County Probation Department.

2000

tices, absent external pressures, new leadership, or
a push from a collegial agency? It will be interesting
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FIGURE 16

DETENTION RATE FOR LATINO YOUTH DECLINE BY 43% FROM 1997–1998 TO 1999–2000.
DURING THAT TIME, THE AVERAGE DAILY POPULATION OF THE DETENTION CENTER
DROPPED FROM 49 TO 37
140
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Sources: American FactFinder Quick Tables. Race, Hispanic or Latino and Age: 2000 for Multnomah County.
U.S. Census Bureau; Santa Cruz County Probation Department.

to watch if probation’s reforms eventually influence prosecutors, defenders, judges,
or the police.
If I could suggest a starting place for the District Attorney’s Office, I would ask
that they measure all of their filing decisions and processes by ethnicity. They
should then review the data to see what it reveals. For example, they may learn
that Spanish-speaking victims don’t have the same access to the D.A. due to
language barriers; therefore, the voice of a victim who may have wanted something other than locking a youth up would go unheard. By using data to improve
the justice system processes, you eliminate the barriers and defensiveness that occur
when people think are being called racists. — Judith Cox
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New York City: Where There’s No Will, There’s No Way
New York City was one of the five sites selected for JDAI planning grants in December
1992. For a decade prior to its selection, the City’s Department of Juvenile Justice
had established a national reputation for improved conditions of confinement,
thoughtful population control, and innovative case management. Department leaders
had recently prevailed in a long, complicated process to win approval to have
Spofford Juvenile Detention Center—long criticized for its poor design and decrepit
physical plant—replaced by two modern, but smaller facilities. Since the combined
capacity of the new facilities would be less than Spofford’s, City officials were concerned that inappropriate or unnecessary use of detention could lead to overcrowding once the new centers opened. JDAI, City officials proclaimed, was perfectly timed
given the challenges they faced in keeping their promise to close

Analyses confirmed
that African American
and Latino arrestees
were more likely to
be formally charged,
adjudicated, and
placed in residential
facilities than their
white counterparts.

Spofford. With a history of creative management, and a determination to lower detention utilization, New York City scored high on the
Foundation’s two primary site selection criteria: The administrative
capacity and political will to implement complicated, inter-connected
reforms.
Detention reform planning went well in New York. In fact, it was one
of only two sites whose initial plans were deemed sufficiently complete
to merit implementation funding. As in other sites, New York had
established both an inter-agency steering committee to provide overall
direction, and a broader collaborative with various sub-committees to
address specific issues. Initially, no structure was organized explicitly to

address racial disparities, even though the City’s detention population was almost
exclusively African American and Latino. However, when inter-site discussions provoked all JDAI sites to focus more on DMC issues, the commissioner for juvenile
justice took the lead in assembling an ad hoc committee to explore and address
racial disparities. Various colleagues, from agencies of all types, rallied to this
leader’s call for attention and action.
The group began its work with a major quantitative study to determine if and
where there were measurable disparities at key decision points in delinquency cases.
The New York City Criminal Justice Agency, a large non-profit organization that
provides pretrial release services to the City’s criminal courts, conducted the study.
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Its sophisticated, multi-variate analyses confirmed that African American and Latino
arrestees were more likely to be formally charged, adjudicated, and placed in
residential facilities than their white counterparts. Armed with these findings, the
committee began to explore strategies for change.
In January 1994, however, a new administration took over City Hall. Its “get
tough on crime” agenda did not align well with JDAI’s objective to reduce inappropriate or unnecessary use of secure detention. Still, JDAI work continued,
albeit without active support from City Hall, whose highly centralized
approach to policy making severely limited the authority of the collaborative, reducing it to an advisory body to suggest policy and practice
changes. Though work on various projects continued for the next few
years, the political will for detention reform had largely disappeared.
Eventually, the Foundation ceased funding New York City, acknowledging
that JDAI and the City’s policy directions were no longer the same. Even
prior to that decision, as attention to detention reform waned, New York’s
detention population soared, despite significant decreases in serious juvenile arrests. And when the two new detention facilities came on line, the
City’s burgeoning detainee population led the administration to back away

In an environment
that no longer
embraced detention
reform in general,
there was even less
official interest in
addressing racial
disparities in
juvenile justice.

from the long-standing commitment to close Spofford. Today, Spofford
continues to be used as a secure juvenile detention center and plans have been
approved to add still more beds to the new facilities.
What happened to the DMC work? Despite the departure of the juvenile justice
commissioner (who was replaced by the new administration), many of the committee’s members sought to sustain the work. Programmatic ideas were developed and
multi-cultural diversity training was planned. But in an environment that no longer
embraced detention reform in general, there was even less official interest in
addressing racial disparities in juvenile justice. Despite the considerable personal
and professional commitment of the DMC committee’s members, their efforts,
perhaps predictably, failed to gain traction in a context no longer supportive of
detention reform in general.
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Multnomah County, Oregon
Census Context
In 2000, Multnomah’s youth population was 74% white, 10% African American, 8% Asian,
6% Latino, and 2% Native American.

Detention Context
In 2000, African Americans were 26% of admissions, Latinos were 8.5%, Asians were 4%,
whites were 60%, and Native Americans were 1%.

Background

Of all the JDAI sites, Multnomah County probably had a headstart in thinking
about and acting on racial disparities in its juvenile justice system. Oregon had
been chosen as one of five places to be studied extensively following passage of the
JJDPA DMC mandate. Professor William Feyerherm of Portland State University,
one of the country’s most cited experts on this issue, was locally based and
accessible to policymakers seeking data or its accurate analysis. As a consequence of
having this national light shined on it, the system’s officials had begun talking
about reducing these disparities prior to JDAI. For example, major efforts had
already been initiated to diversify the work force and to build programmatic
linkages with community organizations. Notably, Multnomah County was the
only jurisdiction visited by the Casey Foundation’s JDAI site selection committee
to present data on DMC and to proclaim it a priority problem.
Perhaps because of this headstart, and despite continued overrepresentation of
minorities in detention as compared to their presence in the general public,
Multnomah’s efforts to reduce disproportionality had the most measurable impact
of any of the JDAI sites. Indeed, Multnomah is emerging as a national model in
the area of reducing disparate treatment of minorities in the juvenile justice system.
JDAI participants in this jurisdiction took very deliberate steps to reduce disparate
treatment as part of their detention reform efforts and, like Santa Cruz, the
detention reform leadership focused on making DMC reduction a key feature of
each reform strategy.
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Strategies to Reduce DMC

A 1993 analysis of Oregon’s data by J. P. Heuser22 found that detention processing
and police referrals were major factors contributing to overrepresentation in
Multnomah County. In the years prior to the detention reform initiative, the
county had made much greater use of detention, and racial disparities were far
higher. In 1993, the Donald E. Long Home (as the secure detention facility is
known) consistently operated at full capacity, which was 128 beds at that time.
However, 20 beds were rented by other counties, and 16 were devoted to a postdispositional treatment program, leaving 92 Multnomah youth in the facility on
an average day. The only reason the population did not go even higher was because
a federal court consent decree mandated emergency releases whenever the population exceeded the court-ordered cap. By 2000, only 33 Multnomah County
youth were in secure detention, including youth who had to be held due to new
laws mandating detention in certain serious cases. Predictably, the “detention gap”
between white and minority youth was also substantial prior to JDAI. In 1990,
Latino youth were more than twice as likely to be detained as white youth (34%
vs. 15%), and Asians, African Americans, and Native Americans were detained at
rates that were 47%–60% higher than white youth.
In response to these data, Multnomah County initially set up a Disproportionate
Minority Confinement Committee, chaired by Presiding Juvenile Court Judge
Linda Bergman, with membership from the police department, district attorney,
public schools, county commission, juvenile justice department (i.e., probation),
and Portland State University. Its objectives were to promote fair and equitable
decisions about police custody and detention and to ensure that system resources
were accessible, culturally relevant, and appropriately used for all racial and ethnic
communities. For a variety of reasons, including two major leadership changes, this
committee achieved little and eventually became inactive, leaving behind virtually
no real legacy. However, once leadership within the system had stabilized, the larger
policymaking collaborative that gave overall direction to JDAI assumed responsibility for making sure that reduction of racial disparities was a key part of juvenile
detention reform. Rick Jensen, Multnomah’s JDAI Project Coordinator, noted
that DMC issues proved to be more effectively pursued in the context of
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comprehensive reforms (and, therefore, under the purview of the policymaking
collaborative) because “disproportionality flourishes in a sloppy system.”
As with much of Multnomah’s successful detention reform initiative, efforts to
reduce disproportionate minority confinement were data driven. According to Judge

Disproportionality
flourishes in a
sloppy system.

Bergman, “once we had real data, we were able to move from
anecdotal information to data-based strategies, because now we
knew how real the problem was.” Multnomah had advantages in
this regard because, as noted earlier, Professor Feyerherm con-

sulted with Multnomah’s JDAI. The Multnomah Department of Community
Justice (as the probation agency is now known) also had a relatively large staff
deployed to operate its automated data collection system and to provide some
analysis.
As Multnomah’s policymaking collaborative developed its core detention reform
strategies, it examined each to ensure that it addressed disparity. For instance, the
county established a series of detention alternatives that were accessible to youth of
color. These included shelter care, foster homes, home detention, and a day reporting center. These programs were contracted to local providers located in the communities of color where the majority of detained youth lived. They were established
both as alternatives to admission to detention and to divert youth from being
returned to custody for violating terms of their release. According to Feyerherm,
by using providers who were engaged with youth in these communities, not only
would the location make them more available to the youth, but also it was hoped
that the youth who might need additional social services would be placed in
contact with agencies and persons who could provide those services.23

Concurrent with the development of detention alternatives, Multnomah carefully developed an RAI to guide admission decisions, introducing it only after
more than a year of discussion and pilot testing. A cross-agency team, including
judges, defense attorneys, prosecutors, probation officers, detention counselors,
school officials, and researchers, developed the instrument. “The objective,” in the
words of the public defender’s representative, “was not to eliminate the use of
detention, but rather to make sure the ‘right kids’ were detained.”24

57

Because reducing racial disparities was an explicit priority, the committee that
developed the RAI was careful to evaluate its individual elements through the lens
of race. For example, instead of relying on criteria like “good family structure,”
which might be biased toward intact, nuclear families and, therefore, against
minority youth, the instrument asks whether there is an adult willing to be
responsible for assuring the youth’s appearance in court. Likewise, the RAI dropped
references to “gang affiliation” that might be biased against youth of color, who are
often characterized in this manner simply by virtue of where they live. Instead of
exclusively using “school attendance” as a mitigating factor, the concept was
expanded to include “productive activity” (e.g., included training, part-time employment). Both were considered good indices of appropriateness for community
placement while, for a variety of reasons, the narrower “school attendance”
criterion might have skewed the RAI to the detriment of youth of color.25
The creation of a new detention intake team was critical to successful implementation of the RAI and effective utilization of detention alternatives in reducing
DMC and detention rates. The team consisted of six to seven intake workers overseen by a “pretrial placement coordinator” (PPC). Each day, the team reviewed
every single youth in detention, their risk assessment scores, their case status, and
their amenability to community-based alternatives. The PPC did daily quality
control checks to ensure that youth were being processed expeditiously and that
staff were faithfully adhering to the RAI. This provided a level of quality control
quite unique for public bureaucracies. If one worker, for example, was overriding
the RAI at a significantly higher rate than other workers, or at a significantly higher
rate for minorities than for whites, that pattern could be noted and addressed
immediately. The result of this level of swift and consistent oversight was substantial compliance with the system’s reform efforts. “While we saw some effect
from the creation of the risk assessment instrument initially,” stated Jensen, “the
impact wasn’t really maximized until we created a system of internal accountability.
Then, the reforms really began to kick in.”
Another key detention reform strategy was the development of a new system
for dealing with the 20%–30% of admissions that were for probation violations
(see Pathway 9, Special Detention Cases). Prior to JDAI, Multnomah County
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detained many youth who violated probation, often inconsistently and frequently
without regard to the risks or needs posed by the youth. To reduce the use of detention for violations of probation (VOP) and to minimize staff inconsistencies, the
county developed and implemented a “sanctions grid” for its community supervision staff to follow. The grid provided a range of sanctions to be used depending
on the seriousness of the violation and the youth’s overall risk status. Officers could
choose among specific options, but they could not go outside the grid’s ranges.
Moreover, line staff could not place youth in detention for a VOP without having
first tried other sanctions. Finally, decisions to detain VOP cases now have to be
approved by the supervisor and by an “alternative placement” committee. The new
sanctions grid immediately reduced the detention population.
Several explicit DMC strategies also had an impact on the changes that
occurred in Multnomah. For example, representation of indigent youth was
enhanced by hiring four half-time trial assistants to help attorneys improve pretrial
placement planning. The trial assistants helped lawyers by obtaining the lists of
children who were scheduled for preliminary hearings and by obtaining discovery
about the youth and his or her charges prior to the hearing. They also identified
strengths and resources a youth might have in the community and appropriate
community-based programs. Trial assistants attended pretrial placement planning
meetings, where all the stakeholders—the district attorney, defender, probation,
and others—made decisions about the appropriate placement of youth scheduled
for preliminary hearings. Because the trial assistants enabled defense attorneys to
have pretty much the same information the prosecution and probation had, these
planning meetings were fairer and more effective. Enhanced representation resulted
in a significant increase in the use of alternatives for youth who would have otherwise faced secure detention. Given the data presented earlier showing that minority
youth, represented by overburdened public defenders, generally experience more
restrictive outcomes than youth represented by retained counsel, enhancing indigent defense may well have played a role in leveling the legal system’s playing field.
The probation department also sought to diversify its staff. According to
Jensen, in the early 1990s, the director of juvenile probation (which is today part
of the Department of Community Justice), Harold Ogburn, made a determined
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and successful effort to “make the department look like the community.” Like most
of the other agencies addressing delinquent youth, probation had been largely
staffed by whites. By the time JDAI started, staff of the department reflected the
demographic diversity of Multnomah County, a factor that facilitated efforts to
achieve parity in treatment.
The JDAI leadership also worked in coalition with the police. Portland
established a community-policing effort that brought law enforcement into contact with youthful offenders in a different way than more traditional policing
approaches. Commander Robert Kauffman, who for a time was in charge of
training community police officers, incorporated the JDAI efforts into his curriculum, so new community police officers were educated in detention reform efforts
from the outset of their service. Training community police officers in the goals of
the JDAI, in turn, helped divert a lot of youth from ever being referred to the
juvenile justice system.
How did these reforms affect
detention utilization overall and
racial disparities in particular? In
1993, the average daily detention

FIGURE 17

PROPORTION OF MULTNOMAH COUNTY DELINQUENCY REFERRALS RESULTING IN
DETENTION, BY RACE AND ETHNICITY
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Source: Keir, Scott et al. Juvenile Minority Over-Representation in Multnomah County’s Department of Community
Justice: Final Report for 2000 (1990 –99). Portland, OR: Department of Community Justice, 2001. Rates for
Native American and Asian youth are not presented because the number of cases involving those youth are
too small to make generalizations, and their presence in this table could inaccurately skew the data.
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in the likelihood that an arrested youth

FIGURE 18

would be detained at some point in

DCJ DETAIN RATE BY ANGLO/MINORITY OVER TIME: 1994–2000
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As Figure 18 shows, when paper
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referrals (i.e., youth who are arrested,
not brought to detention intake, but

issued a summons to appear in court at a later date) are taken out of the mix, and
all ethnic and racial minorities are aggregated together, the disparity between white
and minority odds of being detained vanishes (see Figure 18).
Multnomah’s detention reform strategies significantly impacted disproportionality in part because they had an extraordinary impact on the number of detention
admissions. Between 1994 and 2000, the number of youth admitted to detention
dropped by half for all youth (from 1,107 in 1994 to 478 in 2000) and by half for
both African American and Hispanic youth.
It appears, therefore, that the core detention strategies described above, combined with explicit DMC strategies and an overall focus on reducing disparities,
leveled the playing field insofar as the likelihood that an arrested youth will be
detained is now pretty much the same for all racial and ethnic groups.
These successes are more notable because the strategies were all implemented
during a time when local concerns over youth crime and immigration worked
against reform in general and reducing racial disparities in particular. In the mid1990s, Oregon, like many states, pursued punitive new juvenile justice policies,
like Ballot Measure 11, an initiative passed overwhelmingly by Oregon voters that
mandated that youth charged with certain very serious crimes be tried as adults. All
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youth charged under Ballot Measure 11 must be held prior to
trial, and this seems to have contributed to increased disparities
in Multnomah. Even though the county’s youth population is
three-quarters white, youth of color comprise the majority
detained under this new law. African Americans, who are just
10% of the youth population, are 43% of Ballot Measure 11
admissions to detention. Even though they are in the adult
court system for trial, these youth are still housed in the
Donald E. Long Home, adding about 15 youth to the facility’s
population on an average day. While many of these youth may
have been detained without Ballot Measure 11, prior utiliza-

In 2000, only 12% of
African Americans,
and 11% of Latinos
with formal court
referrals were
detained, and the
average daily
population in secure
custody dropped
from 92 in 1993 to
33 in 2000.

tion patterns indicate that some would not.
Along with youth crime, fears and concerns over immigration were heightened
in Oregon, as they were throughout the West Coast during the early 1990s. With
the highly publicized passage of California’s Proposition 187—an initiative that
disqualified undocumented residents from attending public schools or using public
hospitals—fear of immigrants reached a high point in 1994. Prior to 2000, the
Donald E. Long Home detained youth on Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) holds, a factor that partly explains why disparities for Latino youth were
consistently higher than for other groups. Last year, the Department of Community
Justice declined to renew its contract with INS and, in the intervening period, the
proportion of referred Latino youth in pretrial detention declined by 31%.
Successes and Challenges

Feyerherm cited three factors as contributing to Multnomah County’s successful
efforts to reduce racial disparities in detention utilization:
1. the development of alternatives to detention,
2. training to raise awareness about overrepresentation,
3. the design and implementation of an RAI.26
Additionally, rigorous oversight, improvements in case processing, and enhanced
defender services assured that all of the above factors were used to make the system
more efficient and, ultimately, fairer.
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It is difficult to assess how much difference any particular core or DMC-specific
reform strategy made in Multnomah County. But it is safe to say that somewhere
in that stew of detention reforms—both general and DMC-specific—a combination was found that produced results greater than the sum of the parts.
It seems important to remember that Multnomah’s initial DMC committee
proved ineffectual, but the larger, more authoritative detention reform policy
collaborative took DMC reduction on as one of its central goals. Like Santa Cruz,
the fact that DMC reduction became the focus of the initiative’s leaders, instead of
a subcommittee of subordinates, sent both a broad message about values and
ensured that core detention reform strategies would always be examined through a
racial lens. The county’s efforts to raise awareness of racial disparities occurred
simultaneously with the implementation of substantive and practical population
management strategies. The synergy of awareness-raising and action appears to
have had much more impact than the former could have on its own and seems to
have put some “teeth” into efforts to heighten sensitivity.
Finally, it is important to remember that Multnomah had superior capacities to
produce timely data and related analysis as tools to draw on for discussions. The
availability of facts appears to have reduced defensiveness among system players.
Since 1997, DCJ has had a full-time research and evaluation specialist, with a
background in methodological techniques, who is able to measure the county’s
progress in juvenile detention reform. These data collection and analysis capacities
have served to reinforce early gains and continue to propel this agenda forward.
Multnomah County has improved its detention system overall and reduced
disproportionate minority confinement. In an area of justice system policy and
practice for which there are precious few models, Multnomah’s success is significant.
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King County, Washington — A Promising Approach Unfolds
Informed by the work in Multnomah County and Santa Cruz County (and other sites
nationally), the Building Blocks for Youth initiative has been working with King County
over the past several years to reduce overrepresentation of minority youth in its juvenile
justice system.
Spearheaded by the Youth Law Center’s James Bell,27 this effort began with the
establishment of a committee of high-level juvenile justice system officials, co-chaired
by State Supreme Court Justice Bobbe Bridges and County Councilman Larry Gossett.
Phase I of the project involves reducing disparities at arrest. In Phase II, efforts will be
made to address detention. Phase III will address dispositional decisions.
The project is currently in the data-gathering stage of Phase I, but there have already
been several promising developments. The Seattle Police Department hierarchy has
embraced this effort, and data are being collected on both traffic and pedestrian stops
of youth by racial and ethnic categories. Importantly, the police officer’s union voted to
support these efforts. As the experiences of several JDAI sites have shown, a lack of
support from police will doom efforts to reduce arrest-related disparities. Although changes
in outcomes were not expected during these discussion and data-gathering activities,
King County has already had a reduction in its detention population. This is most likely due
to heightened attention to detention issues and related changes in policies and practice
resulting from a county “master plan” and a reorganization of critical agencies.
As part of the initial data-gathering work, youth from throughout Seattle were hired
to conduct city-wide community mapping. From this information and the police data,
the committee intends to select areas for targeted programming and make adjustments
to police practices as warranted. Already, police have found that Latino youth are overrepresented in traffic citations for driving with a suspended license, and they are beginning to develop appropriate strategies in response.
While it is too early to tell what the ultimate outcome of the King County project will
be, it is off to a promising start. The initiative will track the course of youths who are
arrested and detained from three neighborhoods, comprising 70% of Seattle’s detention
intake, to identify the paths youth of color take before they are detained. King County
participants also plan to replicate and build on some of the efforts pioneered by JDAI
sites in tackling the thorny problem of disproportionate minority confinement.
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Chapter 5

LESSONS LEARNED

T

he stories of these sites’ efforts to reduce racial disparities in juvenile
detention are rich and provocative, but they stimulate as many questions as
they answer. These lessons, like the sites from which they emerged, may be

filled with contradictions and inconsistencies or based on limited data. Certainly,
the lessons are not presented as a kind of reform gospel. Folks in the JDAI sites will
be the first to note that much remains to be done and, therefore, learned. What
follows is primarily a synthesis of their experiences, based equally on both their successes and failures. It is hoped that these lessons will flatten the learning curves of
sites to follow.
1. Without a commitment to juvenile detention reform in general, reducing
racial disparities is unlikely.
It is not insignificant that the sites that registered the most measurable changes, in
terms of the numbers of youth of color detained and the rates at which they are
detained, were sites that sustained an overall commitment to detention reform.
This seems true for two reasons. First, change of this sort requires persistent effort,
both to develop new policies and practices, but also to “unlearn” the old culture and
habits that contribute to unnecessary reliance on detention and disproportionate
confinement of minority youth. It is simply unlikely that we will find this persistence absent real commitment to system reform. When political will for reform disappeared in New York City, for example, the opportunities to sustain work on
racial disparities were substantially reduced and, eventually, discontinued because
there was no longer a reform context in which they might be realized.
Second, it seems pretty clear that “core” detention reform strategies, especially
those implemented for population reduction purposes, are necessary components
for success in reducing racial disparities. All of the sites that reduced the numbers
of youth of color who were detained effectively introduced those core strategies.
However, there are several instances, not reported here, in which sites made
significant progress with the core strategies but did not reduce racial disparities.
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Broward County, Florida, a well-documented leader in detention reform in the
early 1990s, is a good example. These core strategies, therefore, appear necessary
but are not sufficient by themselves to change DMC patterns.
2. An explicit focus on reducing racial disparities is essential.
The sites that had the greatest success reducing disparities were those that

An explicit DMC focus,
and DMC-specific
strategies, combined
with effective
implementation of
core detention reform
strategies, provides
the most potent
mixture for change.

developed a very sharp and explicit focus on reducing minority
overrepresentation in detention. In both Santa Cruz County and
Multnomah County, reform participants did not see reducing
DMC as a necessary byproduct of their general detention reform
efforts. Instead, they made a point of publicly identifying the
issue, and they challenged their agencies and colleagues to take
action by implementing specific changes conceived and designed
to reduce disparities and by examining the core strategies
through the lens of race. Their successes, as measured by their
actual outcomes, imply that an explicit DMC focus, and DMC-

specific strategies, combined with effective implementation of core detention
reform strategies, provides the most potent mixture for change.
3. Reducing racial disparities requires authoritative leadership.
In all the sites we have discussed, DMC reduction was a goal for some people and
often for many. But in Multnomah and Santa Cruz, the top leaders very explicitly
embraced the issue and used their bully pulpits and their authority to push the
agenda ahead. Absent strong leadership from those charged with setting policy and
controlling budgets, it is typically quite difficult for system personnel to take the
risks associated with this kind of sensitive issue, and it may be impossible to find
resources for things like research, training, or new community-based programs.
4. Define the problem in terms that can be changed.
One of the problems that both Sacramento County and Cook County experienced was defining the problem in ways specific enough for initiative participants
to take concrete action. Sacramento, for example, moved “upstream,” trying to
identify and solve a variety of problems that contribute to juvenile delinquency in
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the hopes of reducing the flow of youth into juvenile justice. While that is certainly
a noble aspiration, few if any leaders or line staff could immediately do anything
to fulfill that goal. They could not reduce poverty, end family dysfunction,
improve early education opportunities, or ensure that every child got a healthy
start. In contrast, Santa Cruz’s checklist was brilliant in its simplicity and directness. The checklist identified a host of things that could be changed, and people
were then deployed to accomplish those tasks. Rather than get bogged down in
matters that are not amenable to detention system reform, sites need to focus on
those things that can be changed because they are within their system’s purview.
5. Emphasize action, not just discussion or training.
The JDAI sites that had the most success in reducing racial disparities had a very
pronounced bias for action. To be sure, there were discussions of the causes of
disparities and efforts to heighten awareness and sensitivity. But those discussions
served to reinforce practical change, not to resolve philosophical dilemmas. In
Multnomah County, for example, discussions driven by data analysis guided the
design and implementation of concrete strategies (like the RAI) and proved to be
a powerful way to stimulate change and reinforce commitment.
In contrast, ever since the passage of the JJDPA DMC mandate, little progress
has been made nationally because most jurisdictions either remain stuck in abstract
discussions or have relied on racial and cultural sensitivity training ungrounded in
policy change or day-to-day operations. Indeed, after so many years and so many
dollars spent, it should be clear that such training, no matter how necessary, wellconceived, or well-received, will not suffice to move the system’s DMC-outcome
indicators if it is not linked to changes in policies, programs, and practices.
6. Broad, diverse coalitions can facilitate DMC reduction.
JDAI was premised on the notion that juvenile justice agencies had to collaborate
with each other and with partners from other public agencies and the community,
lest even the best-designed strategies fall prey to obstruction or half-hearted
implementation. The sites’ experiences indicate that this premise is particularly
relevant in the area of DMC. In Multnomah County, for example, it was the

68

LESSONS LEARNED

leaders from the juvenile justice system’s agencies that made up the policy reform
body. Together, they lent a weight to the DMC effort that was greater than the
sum of the parts. Similarly, partnerships with other public agencies are important,

An individual
agency, determined
to address racial
disparities in
detention, can move
this mountain.

because so many detainees, and especially youth of color,
are, in essence, refugees or rejectees from other human
service systems. In Santa Cruz, the very common detention
population management problem of lots of youth awaiting
placement was handled by building partnerships with
county agencies to broaden the mix of dispositional options
available to the courts. In Cook County, the inclusion of

community-based organizations in the JDAI collaborative was probably the key
breakthrough that enabled it to build an impressive continuum of programmatic
options.
7. Individual agencies can make a difference.
Without intending to contradict the lesson just discussed above, it is clear
from the Santa Cruz experience that an individual agency, determined to address
racial disparities in detention, can move this mountain. The probation department
decided not to wait until there was consensus across justice system agencies to take
on this issue. It moved decisively on those aspects of policy, program, and practice
that were under probation’s purview. The changes that were implemented by
probation made a difference. It will be interesting to see whether or not its example
will spread to other agencies. In any event, a lack of partners should not become
an excuse for individual agencies to remain passive.
8. Keep the police in the work.
Racial disparities in juvenile detention begin at the arrest stage. In fact, it is these
disparities that set the stage for disproportionality at all the other decision points
in the court process. In places like Cook County and New York City, the
overwhelming majority of juvenile arrestees are youth of color. While Cook
County demonstrated that it could reduce the overall number of such youth in
detention, it did not change their relative proportion of the detained population.
To do that will require an examination of police policies and practices to determine
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if it is possible to alter the flow of cases. If the police are not at the table, neither
the data nor the authority to affect such change will be present.
In trying to involve the police in efforts to reduce racial disparities in the justice
system, it is important to be aware of the liabilities that law enforcement perceives
it faces. Recent lawsuits about racial profiling, for example, would cause many
police officials to worry that honest participation in these kinds of projects would
subject them to litigation. There is insufficient evidence to suggest specific
remedies for this dilemma, but it is clear that, in some places, notably King
County, the police can in fact be full, active partners in this process of making
juvenile justice more fair.
9. Data really helps.
Although it is frequently difficult to collect data because of the generally poor
status of many systems’ information technology, it is clear that having timely
accurate data, and the capacity to analyze it, can really make a difference in DMCreduction efforts. For one thing, data can be used to define the problem, both its
scope and the specific points at which disparities increase. Those kinds of analysis
enable policymakers to focus on specific policies or practices that otherwise might
be overlooked. Santa Cruz’s experience identifying underutilization of pretrial
diversion with Latino youth is a good example of how data can inform choices.
On the other hand, the lack of police data on arrests in Cook County severely
limited their efforts to develop DMC strategies. Data is also very helpful in depersonalizing these issues. When people have facts before them, they tend to accept
them and seek to move on to solutions rather than getting lost in blame and guilt.
Finally, data is critical to monitor and reinforce changes. It is no accident that the
JDAI site with the greatest analytical capacities (Multnomah) had the greatest
outcome changes. Consistent reporting of data reinforced progress or indicated
when change was not happening.
At the same time, it is important to note that data is not the magic bullet. New
York City, for example, conducted a rigorous analysis of disparities at key decision
points, clearly identifying areas ripe for change. However, without a sustained
commitment to detention reform, this research proved of little value to youth in
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confinement. Similarly, the DMC mandate in the JJDPA has required all states to
statistically analyze disproportionate minority confinement in general and at
specific points in the process. Few states if any, however, have found effective ways
to translate those data into actions that resulted in measurable reductions in racial
disparities.
10. It is possible to reduce racial disparities in juvenile detention.
Since 1989, federal mandates have provided that states should do something about
DMC, but there has been little progress. Indeed, nationally and in most states,
racial disparities in juvenile justice deepened throughout the 1990s. Multnomah
and Santa Cruz demonstrate empirically that jurisdictions can not

After more than
a decade of focus
and dozens of
studies, we now
have examples
of success.

only reduce the number of youth behind bars (something Cook
County also accomplished), but also the odds that kids of color
will be detained. After more than a decade of focus and dozens of
studies, we now have examples of success—not on paper, but in
emerging models, whose lessons are relevant to all who aspire for
a fairer justice system for juveniles.
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RESOURCES ON REDUCING RACIAL
DISPARITIES IN JUVENILE DETENTION
Organizations
Annie E. Casey Foundation
Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative
701 St. Paul Street
Baltimore, MD 21202
410-547-6600
www.aecf.org
Juvenile Detention Alternative Initiative Sites
Cook County
Mike Rohan, Director
Juvenile Probation & Court Services
Circuit Court of Cook County
1100 S. Hamilton Avenue
Chicago, IL 60612
312-433-6575
Multnomah County
Rick Jensen, Detention Reform Initiative Coordinator
Juvenile & Adult Community Justice
1401 NE 68th Avenue
Portland, OR 97213
503-988-5698
rick.k.jensen@co.multnomah.or.us
Sacramento County
Gerald Root, Manager of Resource and Development Unit
Sacramento Superior and Municipal Court
Court Resources Building
Sacramento, CA 95827
916-874-6880
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Santa Cruz County
John Rhoads, Chief of Probation
Probation Center
3650 Graham Hill Road (mailing address: PO Box 1812)
Santa Cruz, CA, 95061
831-454-3800
ma.schott@co.santa-cruz.ca.us
For more information on the Seattle DMC initiative, contact:
James Bell, Esq., Director
W. Haywood Burns Institute for
Juvenile Justice, Fairness and Equity
417 Montgomery Street, Suite 900
San Francisco, CA 94104
415-543-3379 ext. 3909
burnsinstitute@yahoo.com
For more information on the Building Blocks For Youth initiative, contact:
Liz Ryan
Youth Law Center
1010 Vermont Avenue, NW, Suite 310
Washington, DC 20005
202-637-0377

Other Organizations
American Bar Association
Juvenile Justice Center
740 15th Street, NW, 10th Floor
Washington, DC 20005
202-662-1506
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Center on Juvenile & Criminal Justice
1234 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite C1009
Washington, DC 20005
202-737-7270
Coalition for Juvenile Justice
1211 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 414
Washington, DC 20036
202-467-0864
info@juvjustice.org
Juvenile Law Center
1315 Walnut Street, 4th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19107
215-625-0551
info@jlc.org
Minorities in Law Enforcement Service
1817 Capitol Avenue
Sacramento, CA 95824
916-812-9541
National Council on Crime and Delinquency
1970 Broadway, Suite 500
Oakland, CA 94612
415-896-6223
pat@nccdsf.attmail.com
National Innovations to Reduce DMC
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Department of Justice
810 Seventh Street, NW
Washington, DC 20531
202-307-5911
askjj@ncjrs.org
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Pretrial Services Resource Center
1010 Vermont Avenue, NW, Suite 300
Washington, DC 20005
202-638-3080
psrc@pretrial.org
The Sentencing Project
514 10th Street, NW, Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20004
202-628-0871
staff@sentencingproject.org
Youth Law Center
1010 Vermont Avenue, NW, Suite 310
Washington, DC 20005
202-637-0377
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